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Coming to Terms with Death:
The Cruzan Caset
by
SUSAN R. MARTYN AN]) HENRY J. BOURGUIGNON*
This is my hand. I can move it, feel the blood pulsing through it.
The sun is still high in the sky and I, Antonius Block, am playing
chess with Death.'
Death appears as a player in Ingmar Bergman's richly symbolic
movie, The Seventh Seal. Antonius Block, a knight returning from
the crusades, encounters death and engages it in a game of chess as
a way of delaying his own death while he searches for meaning in life.
Block never doubts the inevitable fate that he, and all of us, must face.
So he bargains with death to "live as long as I can hold out against
you."
2
Few ever encounter death face to face as Block did; many spend
their lives fleeing it. Though not dramatically clad in a black cloak
and hood, as in Bergman's movie, death haunts most of us at various
times in our lives. We might seek to deny death, or like the knight,
to forestall it. Like moves in a game of chess with death, we diet or
stop smoking or increase our exercise. Perceived but unseen, death
lurks behind so many of our dreams and fears, our ambitions and
neuroses.3 Though we know that ultimately we cannot play death to
a draw, we employ what moves we can devise to hold it at bay.
Medical science today has vastly enriched our repertoire of de-
laying moves. Doctors can peer inside us to diagnose our condition
with incredible precision; they can prescribe ever more accurately de-
fined medications; they can stitch in new bodily organs when ours fail;
they have devised machines that can move for our immobile limbs,
breathe when our lungs no longer function, or nourish us when we
cannot eat.
t © 1991 Susan R. Martyn and Henry J. Bourguignon.
* Both authors are professors of law at the University of Toledo College of Law. They
filed an amicus brief supporting the family in the Cruzan case on behalf of the Evangelical
Lutheran Church in America. The opinions expressed in this Article are solely those of the
authors.
This Article is dedicated to the family of Nancy Cruzan, who sacrificed their privacy to
protect Nancy's.
1. Spoken by the knight in Ingmar Bergman's movie The Seventh Seal (Janus Films
1956).
2. Id.
3. E. BECKER, THE DENiAL oF DEaTH passim (1973).
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Ultimately, these evasive moves become too much for some to
bear. Worn down by the cost of continuing the match, they decide
to withdraw. When a terminally ill person remains fully competent and
conscious, philosophers and courts generally agree that she should be
able to stop medical treatment in order to die in peace and dignity.4
When the sick person, perhaps with her family, has come to terms
with death, she should not be forced to continue the futile moves.
For others, whose lives might be maintained medically for long
periods, conscious choice has become impossible. They cannot decide
for themselves whether to continue, perhaps for years, to hold off
death's inevitable checkmate. For those who have irretrievably lost
consciousness or competence, some other party must make life and
death choices. This Article focuses on this group and the profound
ethical and legal dilemmas involved in making the final moves for
them. But choices must be made-to continue to play the game is as
much a decision as to withdraw.
In light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan
v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,5 we address one question:
For a permanently unconscious person, who should decide whether
to continue or to end the death delaying moves? We conclude that
family members, when they remain close and caring, should be pre-
sumed to be the ones to come to terms with death for their perma-
nently unconscious loved one. The state's role should remain secondary.
1. The Cruzan Decisions
After an automobile accident in January 1983, Nancy Cruzan was
found by a rescue squad face down in a ditch, lifeless and not breath-
ing. Squad members managed to restart her heartbeat and breathing,
but she was deprived of oxygen for a significant period of time and
suffered brain damage. 6 At first Nancy's family hoped that she would
recover. Because she could not swallow on her own, surgeons, with
the consent of her husband, implanted a gastrostomy tube directly into
her stomach through which she received nutrition and hydration. Soon,
however, it became apparent that her brain damage was so severe that
4. E. KtVLER-Ross, ON DEATH AND DYIr passim (1969); see also infra notes 67-70 and
accompanying text.
5. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990) (plurality opinion).
6. Estimates of the time range from 12 to 14 minutes. "The Missouri trial court ...
found that permanent brain damage generally results after 6 minutes in an anoxic state ......
Id. at 2845.
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her condition would not improve. Her coma developed into a per-
sistent vegetative state.7 Seven years later, when the Supreme Court
decided her case, Nancy, age thirty-two, remained unconscious in a
fetal position in a Missouri state hospital. With continued artificial
feeding, Nancy could have lived for thirty years or more, completely
dependent on others for total care and devoid of pain or pleasure. S
In the summer of 1987, Nancy's parents, 9 who continued through
the years to visit and provide what care they could for Nancy, came
to terms with this tragic reality and concluded that Nancy would not
want to continue tube feeding in her permanent state of unconscious-
ness. They knew that she could continue to live for many years in this
condition if fed through the tube. They knew she would die within
a matter of days or a few weeks if the feeding tube were no longer
used. After long thought and prayer, they requested that hospital au-
thorities discontinue artificial nutrition and hydration. 10
When the hospital administration denied their request, Nancy's
parents applied to the local probate court for a guardianship.1' At trial
on their request to terminate use of the feeding tube, testimony was
presented concerning the medical reality of Nancy's condition and ev-
idence was heard from family and friends concerning her prior state-
7. Patients in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) can breathe, digest food, and eliminate
waste. They can open or close their eyes suggesting periods of sleep and waking. They can
move their eyes and manifest other reflex responses to external stimuli, such as coughing,
gagging, or moving their limbs. But these patients, though occasionally appearing to give
conscious responses, do not feel pain or sense their surroundings. They have irretrievably lost
consciousness. Id. at 2845 n.1; see also In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 403, 529 A.2d 434, 438
(1987); PRESImENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETmcAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIomEDicAL AND BHAWvoRAL. RESEARCH, DEciDiNo TO FoREco LIFE-SusTAINO TREATMENT
174-75 (1983) [hereinafter DEcIING To FoREoo].
8. Nancy died December 26, 1990, 12 days after her artificial nutrition and hydration
were discontinued. Following the Supreme Court's decision in July 1990, her parents asked
the probate court to consider new evidence from three of Nancy's co-workers. The Missouri
Attorney General withdrew from the case in September, claiming the state had no further role
in the case once Missouri's law had been clarified.
At the new hearing in November 1990, Nancy's physician described her life as a "living
hell," and Nancy's co-workers testified that she would not want to continue living "like a
vegetable." Probate Judge Charles Teel ruled that the additional testimony met Missouri's
clear and convincing evidence standard and gave permission for the feeding tube to be removed.
Nancy Cruzan Dies, Outlived by a Debate over the Right to Die, N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1990,
at Al, col. 1.
9. Nancy's husband had sought and obtained a divorce after the accident. Cruzan v.
Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 431 (Mo. 1988) (Higgins, J., dissenting) (quoting trial court
judgment).
10. Cruzan v. Director, 110 S. Ct. at 2846.
11. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), aff'd, 110 S. Ct.
2841 (1990).
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ments about being kept alive by artificial means. A long-time friend,
for example, testified that Nancy had "said that she hoped that [all
the] people in her family knew that she wouldn't want to live [as a
vegetable] because she knew it was usually up to the family whether
you lived that way or not.' ' 2 The trial court concluded that Nancy's
lifestyle and other statements to family and friends suggested "that
given her present condition she would not wish to continue on with
her nutrition and hydration."' 3 An unrelated guardian ad litem ap-
pointed by the court initially opposed the parents' decision, but changed
his mind after hearing the trial testimony. The trial court, with the
concurrence of the guardian ad litem, held that Nancy retained the
right, under the state and federal Constitutions, to refuse or terminate
treatment. 
4
Missouri's Attorney General appealed directly to the Missouri Su-
preme Court which, in a sharply divided four-to-three decision, re-
versed the trial court order approving termination of Nancy's artificial
feeding." The majority doubted the existence of any privacy rights that
Nancy or her family might assert and found that, even if such rights
existed, the state's interest "in life, both its preservation and its sanc-
tity" outweighed any personal interest of the individual or family to
refuse treatment. 6 The Missouri court held that Nancy's prior con-
versations concerning her wish to terminate treatment if in a vegetative
state failed to satisfy their interpretation of a clear and convincing
evidence standard. '7
The United States Supreme Court, in a fragmented five-to-four
decision, affirmed the judgment of the Missouri Supreme Court. 8 All
12. Id. at 2874 n.19 (Brennan, J., dissenting). When Nancy's grandmother died of heart
problems, Nancy told her sister "it was better for my grandmother not to be kind of brought
back and forth [by] medical [treatment], brought back from a critical near point of death."
Id. (quoting Trial Transcript at 541). A close friend testified at trial that Nancy had said
"'several times' that 'she wouldn't want to live that way because if she was going to live, she
wanted to be able to live, not to just lay in a bed and not be able to move because you can't
do anything for yourself."' Id. (quoting Trial Transcript at 390, 396).
13. Cruzan v. Director, 110 S. Ct. at 2846 (quoting Appendix to Petition for Certiorari,
Cruzan v. Director, No. 88-1503, at A97-A98); Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W. 2d at 432, 433
(Higgins, J., dissenting) (quoting trial court transcript).
14. Id. at 2846, 2874 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
15. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W. 2d 408.
16. Id. at 424.
17. The Court found that clear and convincing evidence of Nancy's physical condition
and its irreversible nature had been established. Id. at 422. With respect to Nancy's wishes
however, they held that the trial testimony was "inherently unreliable and thus insufficient to
support the co-guardians claim to exercise substituted judgment on Nancy's behalf." Id. at
426.
18. Cruzan v. Director, 110 S. Ct. at 2841. The Cruzan case was decided on the same
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members of the Court showed sensitivity to the tragic plight of Nancy
Cruzan and her family. Chief Justice Rehnquist prepared the opinion
of the Court in which Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy
joined. Justices O'Connor and Scalia submitted separate concurring
opinions. Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices
Marshall and Blackmun joined. Justice Stevens filed a separate dis-
sent. Because of the subtle yet crucial distinctions that separate the
members of the Court, their opinions call for a brief summation.
Chief Justice Rehnquist reviewed state court decisions in similar
cases and acknowledged that the Cruzan case presented the Court for
the first time with an issue involving what is popularly called the "right
to die."19 Rehnquist briefly conceded the essential thrust of the Mis-
souri Supreme Court decision, the state's absolute interest in life, and
focused primarily on Missouri's requirement that Nancy's previously
stated wishes be shown by clear and convincing evidence. He assumed
that prior decisions implied a constitutional right for a competent per-
son to refuse medical treatment, even treatment essential to life. 20 He
insisted, however, that the person's liberty interest must be balanced
against relevant state interests.
2'
This case, Rehnquist concluded, required surrogate decisionmak-
ing, because the patient was no longer able to decide for herself. He
accepted Missouri's interest in the preservation of life as a consti-
tutionally sufficient basis for its requirement that Nancy's previously
expressed wish to die under such circumstances satisfy the clear and
convincing evidence test. Because of the finality of the surrogate's
choice of life or death for the incompetent patient,2 Missouri was not
constitutionally prohibited from seeking "to safeguard the personal
day as two abortion cases, Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990), and Ohio v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972 (1990). The Court barely acknowledged any
relationship between the life and death issues involved in the two different contexts. The
philosophical, moral, and constitutional questions in the termination of treatment cases
obviously are intertwined and partially overlap with the questions raised in the abortion debate.
See, e.g., Minow, The Role of Families in Medical Decisions, 1991 UTr L. Rnv
We have chosen in this Article to follow the lead of the Supreme Court and try to shed
some light on the issues involved in cases involving health care decisions for incompetent
patients without relating them to issues in the abortion debate. In our view, any changes in
abortion law should not depend upon nor affect the arguments made here.
19. Cruzan v. Director, 110 S. Ct. at 2846-51. The problem with using the popular term
"right to die" is that it broadly encompasses the right to terminate life by active interventions
as well as the right to refuse or to terminate treatment. The latter issue is addressed in the
Cruzan case. We reject the suggestion that the right to die should embrace the right to kill
oneself or to assist someone in killing herself. The distinction between suicide and termination
of treatment is discussed below. See infra notes 71-83 and accompanying text.
20. Cruzan v. Director, 110 S. Ct. at 2852.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 2854.
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element of this choice through the imposition of heightened eviden-
tiary requirements. "23
In closing, Rehnquist rejected the family's argument that the Con-
stitution required Missouri to recognize decisions made by the family
on behalf of an incompetent family member. If the state were required
by the Court to recognize a surrogate decisionmaker, "the Cruzans
would surely qualify," 24 Rehnquist conceded, but since "there is no
automatic assurance that the view of close family members will nec-
essarily be the same as the patient's," the Constitution, he insisted,
does not require the state to repose this right of substituted deci-
sionmaking with anyone.25 Only Nancy's own decision to terminate
treatment counted, and in Missouri, that must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence. Rehnquist concluded "that Missouri may per-
missibly place an increased risk of an erroneous decision on those seek-
ing to terminate an incompetent individual's life-sustaining
treatment.'"26
Justice O'Connor, who provided the necessary fifth vote to con-
stitute a majority, wrote separately to emphasize that individual states
should be allowed to craft "appropriate procedures for safeguarding
incompetents' liberty interests. ' 27 The liberty interest of the fourteenth
amendment, Justice O'Connor insisted, protects the right of indivi-
duals to refuse unwanted medical treatment. On this point, O'Connor
agreed with the Rehnquist opinion, as well as with the four dissenters.
Justice O'Connor explicitly included in this constitutional right the
refusal of nutrition and hydration, which she considered indistin-
guishable from other life-sustaining medical treatments. 28 Noting that
the Court had never decided the issue, Justice O'Connor argued that
the Constitution might compel the states to give effect to the health
care "decisions of a patient's duly appointed surrogate." 29
23. Id. at 2853.
24. Id. at 2855.
25. Id. at 2856.
26. Id. at 2854.
27. Id. at 2859 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
28. See id. at 2857.
29. Id. at 2858. The majority opinion also recognized that this issue had not yet been
addressed. Id. at 2856 n.12.
Justice O'Connor spoke of a variety of ways that surrogates may be designated. Id. at 2857-
58. She identified three categories of current state statutes that assist in the task of surrogate
appointment: durable power of attorney statutes, health care decisionmaking statutes, and
living will laws.
Durable power of attorney statutes exist in all jurisdictions. For citations to relevant state
provisions, see id. at 2858 n.3. They were enacted to correct a defect in common-law powers
of attorney, which terminate automatically when the principal becomes incapacitated, thus
[Vol. 42
Justice Scalia, reiterating his previously expressed views,30 simply
denied that the Constitution was relevant to the issues of this case.
He effectively reduced the case to a simple syllogism: States tradi-
tionally have punished suicide; termination of medical treatment is
suicide; therefore, Missouri had the constitutional power to prohibit
the termination of nutrition and hydration to Nancy Cruzan because
it would have amounted to assisting suicide. 31 Even if Nancy had been
competent, or if she expressed clearly and convincingly her desire to
have medical treatment ended if she were ever in a persistent vegetative
state, the State of Missouri, according to Scalia, had the power to
decide whether or not to honor that wish.3 2
Justice Brennan, in a lengthy dissent, first pointed out that eight
members of the Court agreed that a competent person has a consti-
tutional right to refuse or terminate medical treatment.33 He insisted
that this liberty interest amounted to a fundamental right and could
be overridden by the state only if the state had a compelling interest.34
Brennan agreed with O'Connor that artificial nutrition and hydration
could not be distinguished from any other form of medical treatment.3 5
He also agreed with all members of the Court, perhaps including even
Scalia, that an incompetent patient like Nancy Cruzan retains con-
stitutional rights.
36
After concluding that Nancy Cruzan had a constitutionally pro-
tected fundamental right to be free from unwanted medical treat-
ment,37 Justice Brennan analyzed Missouri's interest in refusing to allow
becoming ineffective in situations like Cruzan's. "'[D]urable' ... means that an agent's
authority to act continues after his or her principal is incapacitated." DECIDING To FOREGO,
supra note 7, at 146. General durable power of attorney statutes originally were created to
remedy common-law problems in powers of attorney conveying authority to transact business
affairs, hence their validity for health care decisionmaking is untested.
To clarify decisionmaking power in health care matters, 13 states have enacted health care
decisionmaking statutes that expressly authorize the appointment of surrogates or proxies for
making health care decisions. Cruzan v. Director, 110 S. Ct. at 2857 n.2. An additional 12
states provide for the appointment of health care proxies in their living will statutes. Id. at
2858 n.4.
Of course, probate courts generally have jurisdiction to appoint guardians or guardians ad
litem as surrogate decisionmakers. A MmsEL, Tnm RIGHT To Dm 220 (1989).
30. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3064 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2344 n.6. (1989) (plurality opinion).
31. Cruzan v. Director, 110 S.Ct. at 2860-63 (Scalia, J., concurring).
32. See id. at 2859.
33. See id. at 2865 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 2869. But in the same breath he stated that "no State interest could outweigh
the rights of an individual in Nancy Cruzan's position." Id.
35. Id. at 2866.
36. Id. at 2867.
37. See id.
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termination of the treatment. The state's only asserted interest was
abstract: the preservation of life in general. Justice Brennan found that
this did not outweigh Nancy's choice to end treatment under these
circumstances. 38 Missouri did have a legitimate interest, Brennan con-
ceded, in assuring the accuracy of the decision to terminate nutrition.
But Missouri could not use its rigorous rule of clear and convincing
evidence to achieve the state's substantive goal: preservation of all
life.39
Justice Stevens expressed his dissent in a separate opinion. Com-
menting on the position of the court-appointed guardian ad litem who
agreed with the trial court that artificial feeding should be terminated,
Stevens questioned whether the state had any interest at all in requiring
continued medical treatment. 4°
Justice Stevens reflected sensitively on death and dying in modern
society. He commented on modern medical technology and its power
through "highly invasive treatment [to] perpetuate human existence
... that some must reasonably regard as an insult to life.' '4 As a
result he concluded that dying remained an area of privacy protected
by the Constitution from governmental intrusion.4 2 He argued that
Missouri's assertion of an interest in the protection of life failed even
to meet the standard of minimum scrutiny, because it was really an
effort to define life rather than to protect it.43 Commenting that "[t]he
more precise constitutional significance of death is difficult to de-
scribe," he hinted that an establishment clause issue might be impli-
cated:
[N]ot much may be said with confidence about death unless it is said
from faith, and that alone is reason enough to protect the freedom
to conform choices about death to individual conscience .... It is
not within the province of secular government to circumscribe the
liberties of the people by regulations designed wholly for the purpose
of establishing a sectarian definition of life."
Justice Stevens agreed with Justice Brennan that the Constitution
limits a state's choice of surrogate decisionmaker to "those who will
care enough about the patient to investigate her interests with par-
ticularity and caution. ' 45 He also rejected the majority's arguments
38. Id. at 2870.
39. Id. at 2871.
40. Id. at 2880-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 2883.
42. Id. at 2883-86.
43. Id. at 2886.
44. Id. at 2885, 2888.
45. Id. at 2891. Justice Brennan concluded that "a State generally must either repose the
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42
for accepting the state's policy favoring life. 46 If the state constitu-
tionally can define life and establish an absolute policy preserving life
in any form, Justice Stevens insisted, a state also could insist on the
quality of life and "favor a policy designed to ensure quick and com-
fortable deaths by denying treatment to categories of marginally hope-
less cases. "
47
The tenuous balance on the Court presages further cases in which
the Court will refine or reconsider the close distinctions that presently
mark the boundaries separating its members. The error in the ma-
jority's opinion can be stated simply, but an adequate grasp of this
error will call for full elaboration of earlier state court decisions and
the Supreme Court's own analysis in Cruzan. The majority erred in
tolerating too broad a role for the State of Missouri in making the
substantive moral decision whether to terminate Nancy Cruzan's ar-
tificial feeding. In this case, Nancy's family, not the State, should have
made the substantive determination and the value judgment leading
to that decision. To illustrate the majority's error, we analyze in Part
II earlier state court decisions and their underlying philosophical ap-
proaches and then sketch in Part III a model for conservative con-
stitutional analysis that should have informed the Supreme Court's
decision in Cruzan.
II. State Court Analysis
Since relevant federal precedents were lacking, 48 the Supreme Court
in Cruzan reviewed with care the thoughtful decisions of the state ju-
diciary, beginning with In re Quinlan.49 These state cases also embody
a rich and sensitive moral consensus that has developed over the past
two decades. The Cruzan majority acknowledged this consensus but
refused to follow the state courts' lead.
When state courts have addressed the requests of those who wish
to die, they have refused to simplify the mystery that attends life and
death. Recognizing the wide variety of factors that inform such a de-
choice with the person whom the patient himself would most likely have chosen as proxy or
leave the decision to the patient's family." Id. at 2877 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 2890 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 2891.
48. The only federal case is Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988) (husband
and family sought court directive to remove nutritional tubes).
49. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). There are now
over 50 state court decisions dealing with issues of refusal or termination of treatment. See,
e.g., Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 412 n.4 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (collecting cases).
For a list of cases since the Missouri Supreme Court's Cruzan decision, see In re Longeway,
133 Ill. 2d 33, 37-38, 549 N.E.2d 292, 294 (1989).
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cision and aware of the complex and sensitive issues involved, state
courts have circumscribed termination of treatment decisions with both
procedural and substantive safeguards. By procedural determination
of the facts, courts have required careful study primarily of the pa-
tient's current medical condition, the medical facts, and if she remains
unconscious or incompetent, her relationship with family decision-
makers. In making substantive determinations of moral values, courts
have explored the patient's past life, often unveiling a complex tap-
estry woven from the fabric of life experience, relationships, and deeply
held beliefs. Ever aware of the need to avoid simplistic formulas, courts
have favored flexible approaches that encourage a search for as com-
plete a revelation of the blend of life history and current physical and
emotional needs as possible.
50
This flexibility has allowed most state courts to remain open to
changes in medical technology that continue to present new dilemmas
in decisionmaking. Though criticized for using time-consuming and
expensive procedures, courts have offered those with controversies un-
predictable a generation ago the possibility of a creative resolution to
seemingly inscrutable conflicts.
Careful study of these decisions reveals that nearly all state courts
aim toward a similar goal: they seek assurance that the patient or her
surrogate has the correct medical data upon which to base a decision,
and that the selected option is consistent with the expressed desire or
50. In order to retain flexibility, courts have rejected a number of traditional, categorical
distinctions proffered to explain or justify a result. Thus, courts have held that it is irrelevant
whether the action at issue is the withholding, withdrawal, refusal, or termination of treatment.
See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 379 So. 2d
359 (Fla. 1980); In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978); Lane v.
Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978); Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647.
Similarly, whether the treatment is "ordinary" or "extraordinary" has been rejected in favor
of a more general analysis of benefits and burdens. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 147
Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1018-19, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 491 (1983); Brophy v. New England Sinai
Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 436, 497 N.E.2d 626, 637 (1986); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 370-72,
486 A.2d 1209, 1234-35 (1985).
The distinction between active and passive conduct also has been successfully challenged.
See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1144, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306
(1986); Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 196, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225 (1984);
Brophy, 398 Mass. at 439, 497 N.E.2d at 638.
Most recently, any difference between artificial feeding and other forms of medical inter-
vention has been rejected. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Flemming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674
(1987); In re Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 399
(1988); McConnell v. Beverly Enters., 209 Conn. 692, 553 A.2d 596 (1989); In re Browning,
568 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1990); Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33, 549 N.E.2d 292 (1989); In re Gardner, 534
A.2d 947 (Me. 1987); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987); In re Peter, 108 N.J.
365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987); In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1987).
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the best interests of the patient. In short, state courts seek to discover
medical fact and moral reality before a decision to withdraw life-sus-
taining treatment becomes final. Once medical facts are fully explored
using appropriate procedures, with few exceptions courts defer to the
patient's or appointed surrogate's decision concerning the substantive
moral values that inform medical decisionmaking.
A. Procedural State Interests
The state surely has a substantial interest in surrounding life and
death decisions with adequate procedural safeguards. The fact-finding
process, whether it takes place at the bedside, in hospital ethics com-
mittees,51 or through the judicial system, must protect these decisions
by assuring that they are based on accurate, reliable medical fact and
projected reality. Both an assessment of the patient's current status
(diagnosis) and a projection of the possibility of change (prognosis)
are central to any person's ability to choose between medical alter-
natives.
Typically, right-to-refuse-treatment cases are litigated in a life or
death scenario. The patient's current diagnosis is either terminal, 52
painful,53 or insentient.5 4 Prognosis in these cases is for a short re-
maining life span,55 continued suffering,56 or a totally irreversible un-
conscious state.5 7
51. Hospital ethics committees first were used in Seattle to select patients for dialysis.
The Quinlan court assumed they existed to assist in sorting out medical facts. Quinlan, 70
N.J. at 49-50, 355 A.2d at 668-69 (citing Teel, The Physician's Dilemma: A Doctor's View:
What the Law Should Be, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 6, 8-9 (1975)); see DEcmlNG TO FoREco, supra
note 7, at 155-56 n.106. The President's Commission recommended that ethics committees be
used as consultative groups "particularly for decisions that have life-or-death consequences
for incompetent patients." Id. at 5. During the past decade, most hospitals formed some sort
of committee composed of physicians, clergy, nurses, social workers, and community members
that seek to assist in the decisionmaking process. Rosner, Hospital Medical Ethics Committees:
A Review of Their Development, 253 J. A.M.A. 2693 (1985).
The Hastings Center Report publishes semiannual updates on ethics committees developments.
See, e.g., Veatch, Advice and Consent, HAsnNGs CENTER REPORT, Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 20;
Wikler, Institutional Agendas and Ethics Committees, HAsTINGs CENTER REPoRT, Sept.-Oct.
1989, at 21. For a discussion of legal issues raised by the use of ethics committees, see Merritt,
The Tort Liability of Hospital Ethics Committees, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1239 (1987).
52. See, e.g., Satz, 379 So. 2d 359.
53. See, e.g., Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209.
54. This is typical of the PVS cases. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health,
110 S. Ct. 2841, 2841 (1990); Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647.
55. See In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454
U.S. 858 (1981).
56. See Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1989);
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State courts demand procedural protection for discovery of med-
ical fact for one primary reason: accurate diagnosis and prognosis
empower a decisionmaker with the necessary prerequisites for an in-
formed choice. The Quinlan court, recognizing the centrality of this
need, prescribed a prognosis committee consultation to ensure ac-
curate medical facts. The New Jersey Supreme Court realized that an
inaccurate diagnosis could lead a patient or proxy decisionmaker to
assume the worst or best when neither was true.5"
Generally, medical facts provide the essential prerequisite for de-
cisionmaking. For example, for patients in a persistent vegetative state,
as Nancy Cruzan was, all state courts until Cruzan followed Quinlan
and deferred to family decisionmakers. 9 Similarly, competent patients
Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986); Leach v. Akron
Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (1980).
57. See In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156 (Del. Ch. 1980); Brophy v. New England Sinai
Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984);
Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647.
58. Even when diagnosis is correct, as it was in Quinlan, inaccurate prognosis may skew
the decisionmaking process. Karen Quinlan lived another decade even though her physicians
thought she would not be able to breathe on her own without the respirator. Wikler, Not
Dead, Not Dying? Ethical Categories and Persistent Vegetative State, HAsTINs CENTER
REPORT, Feb.-March 1988, at 41.
In a few cases, courts view information concerning diagnosis or prognosis as decisive facts
that preempt the treatment decision. For these courts, identification of the patient's condition
or future prognosis does not merely guide the decisionmaker, but instead (improperly we
believe) determines the medical outcome. For example, in Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 381, 420
N.E.2d at 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275, no one questioned either the diagnosis of irreversible
bladder cancer in a 52-year-old, profoundly retarded man, or the prognosis that he had only
a few months to live. The issue, whether to continue blood transfusions that could potentially
extend life by a few weeks or months, was decided not by Storar's mother-who objected to
the transfusions because she sensed that he did-but by expert testimony that said the treatment
was necessary to prevent the patient from bleeding to death. Id. The New York court used
procedure, designed to clarify medical fact, to wrest the final decision away from the patient's
close relative who knew him best.
59. See Rasmussen v. Flemming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987); In re Drabick, 200
Cal. App. 3d 185, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1988); McConnell v. Beverly Enters., 209 Conn. 692,
553 A.2d 596 (1989); Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 122, 482 A.2d
713 (Super. Ct. 1984); Severns, 425 A.2d 156; Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1986); In re Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33, 549 N.E.2d 292 (1989); Brophy, 398
Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626; In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978);
In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987);
Delio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 129 A.D.2d 1, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1987); Vogel
v. Forman, 134 Misc. 2d 395, 512 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1986); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d
114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983); see also Eichner v. Dillon, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
In some cases a patient exhibits all of the same physical incapacity of a patient in a persistent
vegetative state but retains some extremely limited communicative skill. This occurred in In re
Westchester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988),
decided only a month before Cruzan v. Harmon. Unlike Nancy Cruzan, Mrs. O'Connor, the
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making decisions for themselves have not been burdened with sub-
stantive restrictions. 6°
Beyond this interest in assuring accurate procedures for collecting
medical facts, state courts also have an important interest in providing
procedures for fact finding in other areas. For cases involving per-
manently unconscious or incompetent patients, the state's procedural
protections should determine the proper decisionmaker, usually one
or more family members. 61 The procedures also should ensure that the
designated decisionmakers are the persons closest to the patient and
that there are no conflicts of interest that might sway their judgment. 62
B. Substantive State Interests
The Supreme Court majority in Cruzan recognized the "principle
that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in refusing unwanted medical treatment.' '63 In other words, the ex-
patient, "was conscious and capable of responding to simple questions and requests and the
medical testimony suggested she might improve to some extent." Cruzan v. Director, Mo.
Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2875 n.22 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Further, "both
of her daughters testified that they did not know whether their mother would want to decline
artificial nutrition and hydration under her present circumstances." Id.
In other medical circumstances courts ordinarily defer to family or close friends as deci-
sionmakers, trusting those persons to best understand the patient's needs and desires. See,
e.g., In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 20 (Fla. 1990); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68
Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (1980); In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
In some of these situations, however, as in Cruzan, the surrogate decisionmaker may be
faced with an impossible burden of proof concerning moral reality. This occurred in In re
Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985), in which the court restrained the discretion of
the nephew of an 84-year-old woman suffering from severe and irreversible physical and mental
disability.
State legislatures also have attempted to limit decisionmaking capacity in a number of ways.
Most living will laws require determination of either a terminal diagnosis or persistent vegetative
state before giving effect to written declaration. See generally DEcmio To Fo.Eo, supra
note 7, at 141-45.
60. Occasionally a competent patient who possesses adequate medical information is
incapable of making a life or death medical decision. See In re O'Brien, 135 Misc. 2d 1076,
517 N.Y.S.2d 346 (1986). This is more likely to occur early in the decisionmaking process,
when the patient may be coping with grim reality by denying its existence. See E. KfBLER-
Ross, supra note 4, at 34-43. In time, medical facts seep through most patients' denial
mechanisms and they are able to decide. Some patients, however, whether because of lack of
time or heightened fear of loss, never leave the denial mode. Courts confronted with the
inability of a competent person to make a particular decision typically buy as much time as
possible for the patient, allowing a decision based on medical recommendations should the
patient remain unable to decide. See, e.g., Department of Human Servs. v. Northern, 563
S.W.2d 197 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978).
61. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33, 549 N.E.2d 292.
63. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2851 (1990). The majority
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tremely important and intimately personal moral judgments that go
into a decision whether to refuse or to terminate treatment must come
from the patient, not from the state. Eight members of the Cruzan
Court agreed in general with this level of constitutional protection. The
Court divided when it confronted the more difficult issue of surrogate
decisionmaking. When the patient no longer is able to decide for her-
self, what happens to this right to refuse or terminate treatment? A
further study of state court decisions can shed some light on this issue.
(1) Rights of Competent Patients
Before addressing the retained rights of incompetent patients, some
qualifications must be made in the assertion of the right of competent
patients to make medical decisions. Once the medical facts are clear,
the right of competent patients to accept or reject medical intervention
has been overruled by state authorities only because of significant state
interests. Two sufficiently important state interests may justify state
imposition of moral values on medical decisions by competent pa-
emphasized that liberty, not privacy was at issue. Id. (citing Washington v. Harper, 110 S.
Ct. 1028, 1036 (1990)); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S.
584, 600 (1979)). Fourteenth amendment cases were cited, as well as fourth amendment cases
analyzing search and seizure of the body. Id. (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11,
24-30 (1905)). Justice O'Connor found the notion of liberty and the idea of physical freedom
"inextricably entwined." Id. at 2856 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (adding Winston v. Lee, 470
U.S. 753, 759 (1985); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966); Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952); and Union Pac. R.R. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891), to the
cases cited by the majority).
Justices Brennan and Stevens, agreeing with this proposition, also cited an equal protection
case, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). Cruzan v. Director,
110 S. Ct. at 2865 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 2885 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The majority recognized that this liberty interest also is protected by the common law of
battery and informed consent. Id. at 2846-47. Justice Brennan was more explicit about the
relationship between tort law and the Constitution. He pointed out that the right to decline
medical treatment is "securely grounded in the earliest common law" and reflects the Anglo-
American premise of "thorough-going self determination." Id. at 2865 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). "The right to be free from medical attention without consent ... is deeply rooted in
this Nation's traditions, as the majority recognizes." Id. Thus, it is "unquestionably among
those principles 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental."' Id.
The earliest reported informed consent case appears to be Slater v. Baker & Stapleton, 95
Eng. Rep. 860 (K.B. 1767), in which the plaintiff prevailed on a negligence theory because
the defendant physician failed to adhere to the customary practice of surgeons of obtaining
consent before administering treatment.
Accounts of doctor-patient relationships in nineteenth century medical journals also illustrate
this tradition. See R. FADEN & L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFoRmEo CONSENT
76-83 (1986).
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tients: the protection of third party interests and the protection of
life .
4
The Supreme Court in Cruzan cited Jacobson v. Massachusetts65
for the proposition that competent patients have the right to refuse
medical interventions, limited only by the interests of third parties. 6
Jacobson upheld a state mandated smallpox vaccination scheme against
an individual's right to refuse the vaccination because of the danger
of spreading contagious disease to others. Absent such a risk of third
party injury, the right of a competent person to refuse medical treat-
ment is subject only to a determination whether the person has the
requisite facts and ability to decide and has communicated an une-
quivocal decision. Thus, state courts uniformly have upheld patient
choice when a competent patient's rejection of treatment would end
her life, even though continued medical treatment could have pro-
longed it.6
7
The obvious exception involves patients who express a genuine
suicidal wish to die based on a current assessment of their medical
condition that seems hopeless but in fact may be treatable. 68 For ex-
ample, after careful treatment, a patient experiencing the hopelessness
of depression might reverse a previously expressed wish to die.69 But
when the patient's decision results from accurate knowledge of rel-
evant medical facts, even a seemingly irrational belief in a faith healer,
for example, will not justify state intrusion in the autonomous right
to refuse treatment.
70
64. State courts also list the ethics of medical practice as a justification for intervention.
With respect to this interest, the courts uniformly agree:
Prevailing medical ethical practice does not, without exception, demand that all
efforts toward life prolongation be made in all circumstances. Rather, as indicated
in Quinlan, the prevailing ethical practice seems to be to recognize that the dying
are more often in need of comfort than treatment. Recognition of the right to refuse
necessary treatment in appropriate circumstances is consistent with existing medical
mores; such a doctrine does not threaten either the integrity of the medical profession,
the proper role of hospitals in caring for such patients or the State's interest in
protecting the same. It is not necessary to deny a right of self-determination to a
patient in order to recognize the interests of doctors, hospitals, and medical personnel
in attendance on the patient.
Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (citing Superintendent of
Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 743-44, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426-27 (1977)), aff'd, 379
So. 2d 359 (1978).
65. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
66. Cruzan v. Director, 110 S. Ct. at 2851 (citing Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 24-30 (1905)).
67. Id.
68. See Jackson & Youngner, Patient Autonomy and "Death with Dignity," 301 N. ENG.
J. Mm. 404, 405 (1979). For example, a cancer patient might withdraw prior refusal of
chemotherapy if side effects can be abated.
69. Id. at 407.
70. In re Milton, 29 Ohio St. 3d 20, 505 N.E.2d 255 (1987).
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As with the prevention of injury to third parties, the state has
an interest in protecting human life strong enough to override deci-
sions to kill oneself or another. The criminal law does give expression
to an intuitive principle that human life is basic, worthy of respect
and not to be compromised. Although the history is by no means sim-
ple and transparent, Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Cruzan is
certainly correct that English common law prohibited the taking of
one's own life and made it a crime to assist another in such an en-
deavor.
71
Scalia, because of his basic opposition to the creation of privacy
interests, however, insists that no distinction can be made between
suicide and the termination of medical treatment essential to life. In
his view, no fourteenth amendment right can be found "unless the
claimant demonstrates that the State has deprived him of a right his-
torically and traditionally protected against State interference. '72 By
identifying termination of medical treatment with suicide, Scalia is
able to find tradition in American law adverse to the right asserted
in the Cruzan case. He concludes that because there is no support for
the claim that a right to suicide is rooted in our history or tradition,
there can be no support for a right to terminate treatment.7
But Justice Scalia distorts history, legal precedent, and clinical
experience in his effort to identify the Cruzan family's decision to
terminate Nancy's medical treatment as the equivalent of assisting su-
icide. One of the historical sources on which he primarily relied 74 re-
peatedly insists on the traditional distinction "between the withholding
of life-prolonging medical treatment, nutrition, or hydration, and the
taking of direct action to kill." ' 75 Indeed, state emphasis on the sanctity
71. Cruzan v. Director, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2860 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing 4 W.
BLACKSTONE, ComwmNTARIEs *189). Perhaps because opinion began to change in the eighteenth
century, both England and France actually prosecuted only a small fraction of suicides. D.
Huirmp'EY & A. WicKET-, THm RIGHT To DIE 9-10 (1986). By the nineteenth century, most
states had abolished the crime of suicide. Smith, All's Well that Ends Well: Toward a Policy
of Assisted Rational Suicide or Merely Enlightened Self-Determination?, 22 U.C. DAvis L.
REv. 275, 290 (1989). Assisting suicide, however, has remained illegal in most states. In fact,
as Scalia points out, neither the states that ratified the Constitution nor the 37 states that
ratified the fourteenth amendment agreed unanimously about the law of suicide. Cruzan v.
Director, 110 S. Ct. at 2860.
72. Cruzan v. Director, 110 S. Ct. at 2859-60. Scalia insists on fact-specific traditions
since "general traditions provide such imprecise guidance, they permit judges to dictate rather
than discern the society's views." Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2344 n.6 (1989)
(plurality opinion).
73. Cruzan v. Director, 110 S. Ct. at 2859-60.
74. Marzen, O'Dowd, Crone & Balch, Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 DuQ. L. Rsv.
1 (1985).
75. Id. at 9. These authors reiterate the point that "almost all of these decisions have
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of life in the context of terminating life-sustaining medical treatment
is seen by the courts as a protection of the unique expression of that
individual's personality in life. 76 Because we view individual decisions
to forego life-sustaining medical treatment as private, most of us do
not view them as wrong. They are intensely personal decisions that
express our fears, beliefs, and hopes, 77 part of that precious, private
domain where the state is not free to roam. The notion that each per-
son's death is as individual as her life is supported by the observations
of those who are dying or have died and been resuscitated. 7 From an
drawn an explicit distinction between the sanctioned withholding of care and suicide." Id. at
10. For a third time these authors conclude, "Sound jurisprudential reasons, therefore, support
the distinction that now exists in the law between the foregoing of medical treatment, which
the law condones, and the commission of suicide, which it presently discourages." Id. at 13.
This Article, therefore, flatly contradicts the central point of Scalia's dissent. See McKay v.
Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 626 (Nev. 1991) (collecting cases).
Other historical sources of American law in the nineteenth century, cited by Scalia, likewise
provide no basis at all for his position. See, e.g., 1 J. BisHoP, Co NTARIUES ON TEM CRDMAL
LAW §§ 295, 511, 615, 652, 968 (5th ed. 1872); 2 J. B~sHoP, supra, §§ 686, 1187; J. HAWLEY
& M. McGREGO, THE CuRrNAL LAW 35, 144 (3d ed. 1899); F. WARTON, A TREATIsE ON
THE LAW OF HoMacmE 98-100 (1855); F. WHARTON, A TREATIsE ON TiE CiuwnNA LAW § 122
(4th ed. 1857). In fact, Justice Scalia is unable to find a single source even suggesting that
refusal or withdrawal of medical treatment ever was regarded at law as suicide or assisting
suicide. He cited Blackburn v. State of Ohio, 23 Ohio St. 146, 163 (1873), for the proposition
that the criminal law protects all, even "It]he life of those to whom life has become a burden."
Cruzan v. Director, 110 S. Ct. at 2860. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the defendant's
conviction for second degree murder in Blackburn, however, because the trial court had
rejected "testimony offered to prove the predisposition of the [decedent] to suicide." Blackburn,
23 Ohio St. at 165. Scalia cited Commonwealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356, 360 (1816), for a
similar proposition. Cruzan v. Director, 110 S. Ct. at 2860. However, the jury in Bowen
found the defendant not guilty for the same reason that the court in Blackburn reversed the
conviction. Bowen, 13 Mass. at 360. In People v. Roberts, 211 Mich. 187, 178 N.W. 690
(1920), the defendant husband of a hopelessly ill wife was convicted of second degree murder
for placing a poison within the reach of his wife, who knowingly drank it and died. Roberts
has been criticized by the commentator whom Scalia cites, however, because it upheld a
conviction of an accessory when the principal was not guilty of any crime. Comment, The
Crime of Aiding Suicide, 30 YALE L.J. 408, 411 (1921). In any case, Roberts does not involve
the withholding of treatment, but rather a direct intervention-poison-to kill. For a recent
criticism of Justice Scalia's position on suicide, see McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d at 626-27
(1991).
76. See E. KEYSERijNOK, SANcnrr OF LIn oR QuA=TY OF Lim 48 (1979) (quoting A.
Solzhenitsyn). A recent case clarifies this point by articulating an additional state interest "in
encouraging the charitable and humane care of afflicted persons." McKay, 801 P.2d at 628.
77. As Justice Brennan stated: "Dying is personal. And it is profound. For many, the
thought of an ignoble end, steeped in decay, is abhorrent. A quiet, proud death, bodily
integrity intact, is a matter of extreme consequence." Cruzan v. Director, 110 S. Ct. at 2868
(Brennan, J., dissenting); see also DECIDING To FOREGO, supra note 7, at 21-23. Justice Stevens
also made this point. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
78. Elisabeth Kfibler-Ross describes five stages of psychological adjustments that she
commonly observed in dying patients. They are: denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and
acceptance. Although the occurrence of these stages is common, few patients experienced them
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individual perspective, then, addressing the tragic choice that faced the
Cruzan family required the courage to face the inevitability of death
while cherishing the remainder of life.79
The personal experience of dying today confronts medical tech-
nologies that "can reclaim those who would have been irretrievably
lost a few decades ago." 80 Indeed, the very understanding of when
death occurs has been changed by machines. 8' Medical technology has
altered the time, place, and manner of death. Even when not curative,
a machine may sustain a vital function while disease, disability, and
suffering continue. The expected time of death may be extended by
hours, days, months, or years.12 Further, prior to World War II, most
Americans died at home, free to express themselves in a familiar and
private environment. Dying today, however, normally occurs in an
institution dedicated to healing, where a dying patient is often a threat
to an institutional mission.83 Attended by persons who handle tech-
nology, patients may feel reduced to objects at the very time they most
need to express intimate feelings.
The manner of death has also been changed by technology. Death
can now occur because of the side effects of aggressive treatment such
as chemotherapy that may not prolong life but can add to the de-
pendency and suffering of the patient's final days or weeks. Thus,
in the same order and many experienced some but not all. A patient allowed to grieve, who
can avoid artificially prolonging her life, is most able to die with peace and to accept death
as the "final stage of growth." E. KUhBLER-Ross, supra note 4; E. KOBLER-ROSS, DEATH: THE
FINAL STAGE OF GROWTH (1975) (collection of essays describing different viewpoints on death).
Accounts of the peacefulness of passing into death also are given by patients who have "died"
but soon been resuscitated. P. SHEEHaY, ON DYING WITH DIGNITY (1981); see also R. MOODY,
LIFE AFTER LIFE (1975).
79. See generally E. KftLER-Ross, supra note 4, at 38 (describing the denial many
individuals experience when faced with impending death).
80. Cruzan v. Director, 110 S. Ct. at 2878 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, DEFINING DEATH (1981).
82. Nutrition and hydration can sustain PVS or coma patients for many years. See, e.g.,
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 419 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) ("Nancy will continue a life
of relatively normal duration if allowed basic sustenance"). Patients who wish to terminate
mechanical or chemical treatments typically have a life expectancy with treatment of several
months. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
370 N.E.2d 417 (1977) (chemotherapy); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981) (blood transfusions); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio
Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (1980) (respirator). Patients seeking do-not-resuscitate (DNR) orders
typically forego days or hours of life. See, e.g., In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. 466, 380
N.E.2d 134 (1978).
83. See Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 440, 497 N.E.2d 626, 639
(1986); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 380, 486 A.2d 1209, 1240 (1985); see also A. MEISEL, supra
note 29, §§ 12.34-.39 (suggesting the role health care institutions should take in administering
a dying patient's wishes).
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both clinical experience and caselaw recognize that a competent pa-
tient's refusal or termination of medical treatment, even if it threatens
her life, is a constitutionally protected right. Eight members of the
Court assume this is true. Only Justice Scalia identifies the refusal of
treatment as suicide, and even his own sources contradict his eccentric
position.
(2) Rights of Incompetent Patients
For incompetent patients, the focus of the state's interest in pro-
tecting life generally shifts from suicide to the law of homicide because
a surrogate necessarily is making decisions for the patient. 4 The words
in a typical homicide statute prohibit "the unlawful killing of a human
being. 81 5 "Unlawful" is the crucial word for the courts. Direct killing
or providing the means of death is unlawful and therefore constitutes
homicide. Withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining medical treat-
ment, however, has not been viewed as direct killing and therefore is
not homicide.86
The state cases that discuss homicide conclude that neither phy-
sician nor surrogate is criminally liable for implementing a patient's
choice or deciding on behalf of the patient to terminate life sustaining
84. The state's interest in protecting third parties, see supra notes 66-67 and accompanying
text, is not usually relevant except in the case of a patient's minor children. See, e.g., In re
Fosmire, 144 A.D.2d 8, 15-16, 536 N.Y.S.2d 492, 496-99 (1989). When a patient with minor
children chooses to forego life-sustaining treatment, the state's interest in protecting the children
is not sufficient to override the patient's right to decide. See, e.g., Public Health Trust v.
Wons, 541 So. 2d 96, 97 (Fla. 1989); Norwood Hospital v. Munoz, 564 N.E. 2d 1017 (Mass.
1991); Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 75 N.Y.2d 218, 229-231 (1990).
Justice Brennan recognized the existence of this state interest in cases of incompetent
patients, but worried about the effect of the majority's opinion in Cruzan:
Were such interests at stake, however, I would find that the Due Process Clause
places limits on what invasive medical procedures could be forced on an unwilling
comatose patient in pursuit of the interest of a third party.... [W]hy could the
State not perform medical experiments on [Nancy's] body, experiments that might
save countless lives, and would cause her no greater burden than she already bears
by being fed through the gastrostomy tube? This would be too brave a new world
for me and, I submit, for our Constitution.
Cruzan v. Director, 110 S. Ct. at 2869 n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
85. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1988).
86. Nancy Cruzan's father showed his family's sensitivity to this difficult moral distinction
between withdrawing life sustaining medical treatment and direct killing. While his daughter's
case was pending before the Supreme Court, he said:
There have been times that, you know, I've thought, "How can you murder your
own child?" Our decision was based on what we felt like that Nancy would want
and that's all we have to justify. If the decision's wrong, if we're playing God, then
I'll have to live with that. And I'm willing to.
Frontline: The Right to Die? 6 (PBS television broadcast, Dec. 13, 1989).
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treatment.17 First, they reason that carrying out the patient's decision
to refuse medication or medical technology is simply not unlawful.
A physician who acts according to the consent of a patient or surrogate
acts consistently with her duty to do no more than is consented to;
the patient dies by controlling the cause of her own death. 88
Criminal law focuses not only on unlawfulness but also on cau-
sation. Cases turning on the causation issue typically involve patients
with a serious terminal illness whose death is forestalled only by the
continuation of medical technology. Once this medical treatment is
removed with adequate consent, courts attribute the cause of the death
to the underlying illness, not any intervening act of a physician. 9
Even when the patient's condition is not terminal, removing a
medical intervention that sustains life is not viewed as causing death,
as long as the underlying illness or injury is responsible for compro-
mising an essential bodily function such as breathing or swallowing.90
All of these cases assume that a patient or surrogate may request to
87. Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 493-94
(1983); Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 482 A.2d 713, 721-22
(Super. Ct. 1984) (semicomatose patient); Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d
1334 (Del. 1980); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla.
1984); In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Ct. App. 1984); In re P.V.W., 424 So. 2d 1015, 1022
(La. 1982); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re
Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 377, 420 N.E.2d 64, 74, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S.
858 (1981); Leach v. Akron Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809, 814-15 (1980);
In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738, 751 (1983).
88. A physician's act that terminates or fails to initiate treatment contrary to the expressed
wishes of a patient or surrogate, on the other hand, has been regarded as a breach of duty
for which criminal penalties are appropriate. A physician who usurps contrpl of a patient's
decision has breached a duty to respect patient decisionmaking, and if that un'lawful act causes
death, a homicide action may follow.
Justice Scalia cites People v. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d 574, 414 P.2d 353, 51 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1966), for the proposition that a physician can be held criminally liable. Cruzan v. Director,
110 S. Ct. at 2861 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The California Supreme Court in that case, however,
reversed the second degree murder conviction of a physician who assured a cancer patient's
parents that she did not need surgery. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d at 576, 414 P.2d at 356, 51 Cal.
Rptr. at 228. The court held that a "bare showing that Linda's death proximately resulted"
from the defendant's conduct was not enough. Id. at 584, 414 P.2d at 361, 51 Cal. Rptr. at
233. A murder conviction must rest on a jury finding of malice or intent as well, an intent
that consciously disregarded a duty owed to the defendant. Id. at 587, 414 P.2d at 363, 51
Cal. Rptr at 235. The jury did find such an intent in Barrow v. State, 17 Okla. Crim. 340,
188 P. 351 (1920), convicting the defendant of second degree manslaughter. However, the
defendant, notwithstanding his own assertions, was not a physician, although Scalia believed
otherwise. See Cruzan v. Director, 110 S. Ct. at 2861.
89. Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Sup. 127, 482 A.2d 713 (Super. Ct.
1984); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); accord Barber v. Superior Court, 147
Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983); see also N. CANTOR, THE PEaRmANENTLY
UNCONSCIOUS PATIENT, NON-FEEDING AND EUTHANASIA 395-96 (1989).
90. See, e.g., Lantos, Miles & Cassel, The Linares Affair, 17 L., MED. & HEALTH CARE
308 (1989).
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"let nature take its course." 91 What Nancy Cruzan's family sought
permission to do is not and never has been considered suicide or crim-
inal in American law.
Justice Scalia, however, points to cases in which parents have
been prosecuted for murder for starving their child to death.92 These
cases, dealing with omissions when there is a duty to act, certainly are
not the same as the decision made by Nancy Cruzan's parents. 93 Amer-
ican courts have long held that a person has a right to refuse medical
treatment, even when this means acquiescing in imminent and inev-
itable death. Eight members of the Supreme Court are surely on solid
ground in assuming that Nancy, if competent, would have had a con-
stitutional right to have the artificial feeding tube removed. Scalia's
extreme position thus reflects neither American history nor law and
prevents him from confronting the real issue in the Cruzan case: Since
Nancy was not competent, who should have decided for her?
C. Selecting the Best Decisionmaker
Respecting the personal choice of a permanently unconscious or
incompetent patient calls for greater skill, sensitivity, and tenacity than
courts need draw upon when dealing with competent patients.
Typically, state courts recognize and approve of the fact that the
vast majority of decisions on behalf of incompetent patients are made
privately, "outside the judicial forum'' 94 in a clinical setting. 95 In the
clinical context, medical decisions are made by surrogate decision-
makers identified by the patient's physician. Diagnosis, prognosis, and
what the patient would choose are discussed and implemented pri-
vately, sometimes with the aid of an institutional ethics committee.
Although it may be possible to identify a time when a specific decision
has been made, clinical decisionmaking is dynamic rather than static.
Decisions evolve in a process over time, as relatives and friends of a
91. See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
92. Cruzan v. Director, 110 S. Ct. at 2861.
93. Cf. In re Elisha McCauley, 565 N.E. 2d 411 (Mass. 1991) (State may order that an
eiiht-year-old leukemia patient receive a blood transfusion in spite of her parent's religious
objections to the procedure).
94. In re Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 261 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
95. See, e.g., John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla.
1984); In re Spring, 8 Mass. App. 831, 840 n.9, 399 N.E.2d 493, 499 n.9 (1979); In re Torres,
357 N.W.2d 332, 338-339 (Minn. 1984); In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 356, 529 A.2d 404, 414
(1987); Saunders v. State, 129 Misc. 2d 45, 52, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510, 515 (Sup. Ct. 1985); In re
Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 820, 689 P.2d 1372, 1378 (1984); see also Areen, The Legal Status
of Consent Obtained from Families of Adult Patients to Withhold or Withdraw Treatment,
258 J. A.M.A. 229 (1987).
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patient respond to periodic updates about the patient's condition from
health care professionals.
96
Participants in this private decisionmaking process seek judicial
intervention, usually in the form of a guardianship proceeding, only
if disagreements persist. State courts respond by using court proce-
dures to select a decisionmaker 97 and assure accurate assessment of
medical facts.
Most often, as Justice O'Connor pointed out, a patient will not
have expressed any specific desire concerning either the medical in-
tervention being considered or the disease being suffered.9 8 Most of
us refuse to come to terms with death. Our instinctive denial prevents
us from expressing anything about our own dying process. Young peo-
ple especially remain blind to the possibility of their own death and
seldom express their preferences for life prolonging medical treat-
ment. 99
For cases in which little or no information concerning a patient's
wishes is obtainable, most state courts, unlike the Missouri Supreme
Court in Cruzan, seek to safeguard the person-centered clinical ap-
proach by deferring to a decisionmaker who is most likely to under-
stand the patient's general approach to life,' °° or by instructing a
stranger to decide for the patient only after careful consideration of
96. See A. MEISEL, supra note 29, at 152-53, 161-62; DEcmING To FosRa-o, supra note 7,
at 153-54, 159.
97. Courts appoint one or more guardians from among those who request such a
responsibility. Usually a family member is selected, although friends who know the patient
well may be preferred. See A. MEISEL, supra note 29, at 224-34.
98. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2857 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Specific statements the patient made concerning the circumstance that now
confronts her are of course relevant and usually determinative. See, e.g., In re Severns, 425
A.2d 156, 158 (Del. Ch. 1980); Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 27 (Fla. 1990); Delio v. Westchester
County Medical Center, 129 A.D.2d 1, 6-9, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677, 681-83 (1987); Eichner v.
Dillon, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 371-72, 420 N.E.2d 64, 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 270 (1981).
Written statements in living wills or durable powers of attorney carry greater weight than
conversations and life-styles because of the presumption that they manifest greater reflection
and determination. See, e.g., Severns, 425 A.2d at 158.
Even written statements, however, might not contain sufficiently specific instructions to
settle subsequent, unanticipated care decisions. See, e.g., Browning, 568 So. 2d at 32-33. See
also infra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
99. For example, it is unrealistic to expect a 16-year old to think about or express her
views on life sustaining treatment. This is the dilemma faced by Pete Busalacchi, who currently
seeks to move his severely brain damaged daughter, Christine, out of Missouri so that he can
have the freedom to make the same decision that faced the Cruzans. See infra note 116.
100. See In re Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1988); In re Jobes, 108
N.J. 394, 419-20, 529 A.2d 434, 447 (1987) ("The family is best able to decide what the
patient would have wanted."); Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266;
Pollack, Life & Death Decisions: Who Makes Them and by What Standards? 41 RUTGERS L.
REv. 505, 538 (1989).
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the views of those who have known and currently care for that person.'01
In these cases, state courts search for general attitudes toward life,
death, illness, or dependency as well as religious or philosophical be-
liefs.102 Such a search enables the decisionmaker, insofar as is possible,
to "don the mental mantle"'' ' of the now incompetent patient in an
effort to protect that person's subjective concept of deeply held belief.
These courts recognize that a proxy who has known or currently
cares for a patient is likely to understand a patient's response in subtle
ways that often defy objective description. Even when no relative can
be found to fulfill this function, a court can direct the inquiry of those
who know or care for the patient to focus on the benefit and burden
of treatment to that unique person, rather than to a hypothetical, ob-
jective patient under "normal" circumstances. 104
The inherent difficulties of this judicial approach must be con-
fronted directly. Courts, searching conscientiously to find what med-
ical treatment the now incompetent patient herself would want,
ultimately are seeking to unscrew the inscrutable, to speak the inef-
fable. Commentators have discussed the impossible task courts have
set for themselves when they seek to pry into the mystery of the person
who never again can express her desires, her preferences, her pains
and pleasures, her current beliefs in life and afterlife. They also worry
that subjective standards could be used as a charade to cover an un-
conscious attempt by decisionmakers to impose their own views about
the value of the patient's life on that person.'0 5
101. See In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984); In re Ingram, 102 Wash. 2d 827,
689 P.2d 1363 (1984).
102. See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355
A.2d 647 (1976).
103. Superintendent of Beichertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 752, 370
N.E.2d 417, 431 (1977) (quoting In re Carson, 39 Misc. 2d 544, 545, 241 N.Y.S.2d 288, 289
(Sup. Ct. 1962)).
104. The court in Superintendent of BeIchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977), marked the outer limits of applying a subjective standard. In that
case the Massachusetts court considered whether to initiate chemotherapy for a 67-year-old,
severely retarded man in a state institution. Focusing on the burden and benefit to a patient
with a mental age of two years and eight months, the court discounted evidence that most
competent patients would choose chemotherapy. Id. at 750, 370 N.E.2d at 431. It found that,
for Saikewicz, the discomfort of chemotherapy could not be overcome because of his inability
to understand its purpose, and therefore that the burden of the treatment outweighed the 40%
chance for a few more months to live. Id., 370 N.E.2d at 432. The court's focus on Saikewicz's
individual circumstances avoided depersonalizing his unique needs. The subjective focus of the
inquiry would have been more persuasive, however, if the court tested the doctor's testimony
about Saikewicz by ordering an initial trial of chemotherapy to assess whether, in fact, he
could not tolerate the intervention.
105. See generally Dresser, Relitigating Life and Death, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 425 (1990) (use
of living wills, patient's prior values, and family discretion is morally insufficient to protect
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If a court, finding no writing and no clear prior statements, seeks
an objective standard, however, it often will rest on an equally un-
stable footing. The late Professor Rhoden contrasted the subjective
and objective approaches:
[T]he subjective test views a barely conscious person as the com-
petent person that she was, a person whose personality continues on
in some sense. The objective tests, on the other hand, direct us to
focus only upon the benefits and burdens that beset the patient in
her current state-as a barely conscious person unable to hold or
affirm values requiring cognition. 1°6
The objective approach focuses on a utilitarian, present-oriented
analysis of the burdens and benefits to this patient. For some con-
scious but incompetent patients for whom a careful inquiry into pain
and pleasure can be fruitful, this objective standard might make sense.10°
But for a permanently unconscious patient like Nancy Cruzan, who
no longer was able to experience pain or pleasure, the utilitarian bal-
ance becomes meaningless. 08 Benefit as well as burden inevitably will
amount to zero.
This distinction between a subjective and an objective approach
to assessing the wishes of an incompetent patient sheds light on the
Cruzan case. The Missouri Supreme Court was not the first to address
the inherent difficulty of making health care decisions for a person
in a persistent vegetative state. It properly pointed out that no one
can achieve certainty about what any particular person facing a current
health care crisis would want. Third party recollection of previous
statements by the patient may be hazy. Even if clear, those thoughts
were shared in a context that makes them hypothetical because they
were unconnected to the current disease or treatment options. The few
persons who do express clear wishes concerning specific disease con-
ditions and treatments'°9 may change their opinion as life moves on
and perhaps becomes more precious." 0
incompetent patients). See also Ellman, Cruzan v. Harmon and the Dangerous Claim that
Others can Exercise an Incapacitated Patient's Right to Die, 29 JURIMETRICS J. 389 (1989)
(Supreme Court should not make a broad constitutional right-to-die rule in the Cruzan case);
Koop & Grant, The "Small Beginnings" of Euthanasia: Examining the Erosion in Legal
Prohibitions Against Mercy-Killing, 2 J.L. ETICS & PUB. POL'y 585 (1986) (Legal developments
should be carefully scrutinized to determine if they advance the odious Nazi philosophy "that
there is such a thing as a life not worthy to be lived.").
106. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARV. L. REV. 375, 396-97 (1988). See
generally id. at 385-91 (limitations of the subjective approach), 396-403.
107. Just as a parent translates the sounds and movement of an infant into expressions of
comfort, pain, or pleasure, so too can a person familiar with a patient sense and understand
their response to medical care and intervention.
108. In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987).
109. Many persons use living wills to accomplish this. These enactments typically are limited
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Recognizing that a person may change over time,"' the Missouri
Supreme Court proposed a new judicial approach to decisionmaking
for incompetent patients. Driven by its substantive value judgment
that life in any form must be preserved, it required that Nancy's wishes
be proved by clear and convincing evidence.12 Next, it labeled tes-
timony regarding Nancy's wishes "inherently unreliable""' because
they were made under hypothetical circumstances. Finally, it con-
cluded that, once these inherently unreliable statements were disre-
garded, no clear and convincing evidence remained to justify the trial
court's conclusion.
Even if the court's driving motivation is flawed, its candor is re-
freshing. If the testimony regarding Nancy's wishes was unreliable,
then no evidence was presented that could justify the judge's finding
that Nancy would have preferred to die. The court, in other words,
imposed on the Cruzan family an impossible standard." 4 By imposing
this unattainable goal of clear and convincing evidence of what Nancy
would have wanted, the Missouri Supreme Court effectively imposed
upon Nancy its value judgment absolutely preferring physical existence
in all circumstances. In this it erred. Even if it were impossible for
Nancy's family to prove that Nancy would have preferred to terminate
the artificial feeding, Nancy's family, not the state, should have been
allowed to make the moral decision for Nancy.
in scope, however, by factors outside the control of the patient. For example, California's
statute requires the physician to inform the patient of the terminal prognosis before the
patient's wishes are binding. CAL. HEaLT & SAEr= CODE § 7188 (West 1988). In addition,
this statute does not allow the patient to name a proxy. Id.
110. Dresser, supra note 105, at 431; Peters, The State's Interest in the Preservation of
Life: From Quinlan to Cruzan, 50 Omo ST. L.J. 891, 914 (1989).
111. Dresser, supra note 105, at 432.
112. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 424 (Mo. 1988) (en banc). A few other courts
have also followed this approach. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct.
2841, 2855 n.11 (1990).
Miles & August suggest that gender may account for these differences in approach. Miles
& August, Courts, Gender and "The Right to Die, " 18 L., MED. & HEALTH C EA 85 (1990).
113. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 426.
114. In the time following the initial trial court hearing, three additional witnesses came
forward offering testimony regarding Nancy's conversations about terminating medical treat-
ment. Stewart, Right to Die, But . . ., A.B.A. J., Sept. 1990, at. 36, 40. The probate court
subsequently ruled that this evidence met the clear and, convincing evidence standard and gave
permission for the feeding tube to be removed. See supra note 8.
These statements, like the prior testimony concerning Nancy's wishes, would most likely be
labeled "inherently unreliable" by the Missouri Supreme Court. However, the case never
reached the appellate court because the Attorney General gave up the fight, and no one else
had standing to raise the issue. Court Firm on Cruzan Ruling, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1990, at
A30, col 3; Missouri Seeks to Quit Case of Comatose Patient, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1990, at
AI5, col 3.
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One need only read the Missouri Supreme Court majority opinion
to perceive that the evidentiary clear and convincing test was applied
in Nancy Cruzan's case because of the state's asserted absolute interest
in life.115 Missouri ruled that the Cruzan family's decision on Nancy's
behalf would constitute an unlawful taking of her life. Although the
issue arose in a guardianship proceeding rather than a criminal trial,
Missouri's interest in "the sanctity of life itself" leads to the same
conclusion: the Cruzan family's intended act is immoral, unlawful,
and criminal."
6
Eight members of the United States Supreme Court at least as-
sumed that Nancy, if competent, would have "a constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment. 111 7 Not
every individual prefers life to death.' 8 Nancy's right, if competent,
to terminate treatment, did not escheat to the state because she became
incompetent. When permanently incompetent, she retained the right
to have decisions made on her behalf by those who knew and loved
her best.
D. The Slippery Slope
The state's two legitimate substantive interests- preventing injury
115. As the majority wrote, after listing four possible state interests for rejecting the
Cruzan family's request to terminate treatment:
In this case, only the state's interest in the preservation of life is implicated.
The state's interest in life embraces two separate concerns: an interest in the
prolongation of the life of the individual patient and an interest in the sanctity of
life itself. . . .The state's concern with the sanctity of life rests on the principle that
life is precious and worthy of preservation without regard to its quality.
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 419.
116. It follows that the family's only remaining option, moving Nancy to another state
with intent to effectuate her interest, would have been attempted murder in Missouri. On
January 19, 1991, the Missouri Court of Appeals enjoined such an act. A probate court had
granted Pete Busalacchi's request to move his daughter, Christine, from the same institution
where Nancy Cruzan resided to Minnesota. He hoped that more discretion would be granted
him there, enabling him to choose to remove tube feedings that had kept Christine alive for
three and a half years following an auto accident that caused her severe brain damage. Father
in Right-to-Die Case Loses an Appeal, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1991, at A17, col. 2. William
Colby, counsel for the Cruzans, predicted that this option would be possible "in any other
state in the union." Stewart, supra note 114, at 40.
117. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2851 (1990).
118. Justice Brennan recognized several factors that might compel a family to conclude
that a comatose loved one would wish to terminate life supports. A patient may not want to
be remembered in a degraded existence, nor wish to protract family suffering. Id. at 2868
(Brennan, J., dissenting). In short, any person who defines her own existence in relational
terms that exceed mere biological functions may have strong reasons to forego life-sustaining
treatment once relationship becomes impossible.
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to third parties and protecting life by prohibiting suicide and homi-
cide-have no relevance to the case of Nancy Cruzan. Yet, some im-
mediately conjure up another substantive state interest. 119 Although
they might have no specific objection to the Cruzan family's decision
to terminate artificial feeding for Nancy, they fear where this decision
might lead. Cruel, selfish families might use the example of the Cruzan
family to get rid of unwanted, helpless, and incompetent relatives. The
example of Nancy Cruzan might lead to voluntary or even involuntary
euthanasia.'20 Thus a slippery slope argument looms large in discus-
sions of termination of life-sustaining medical treatment for the in-
competent.121 This reasoning accepts the moral correctness of an act
under consideration, but frets over the impossibility of distinguishing
the current case from others more morally troubling.'1
Some people, therefore, share the Missouri Supreme Court's con-
cern that allowing Nancy's parents to withdraw her nutrition and hy-
dration would have been impossible to distinguish from other cases
in which a family with less pure motives seeks to end the life of a
dependent relative.2 Justice Rehnquist noted that "not all incom-
petent patients will have loved ones available to serve as surrogate
decisionmakers,' "2and concluded that "[a] state is entitled to guard
against potential abuses in such situations."''  What already has been
said concerning the state's interest in ensuring adequate procedures to
protect fact-finding for medical care of competent or incompetent pa-
tients provides the best answer to this facet of the slippery slope ar-
gument.'26 The state can and should assure the accuracy of the medical
facts, diagnosis, and prognosis of each case and also assure that any
surrogate decisionmaker has been a close, caring family member or
friend without a conflict of interest. 2 7 This, of course, was done by
119. Cf. McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 628 (Nev. 1991) (recognizing an additional
state interest in the charitable and humane care of afflicted persons).
120. The term voluntary euthanasia refers to the direct intervention to terminate life by
request of a competent patient or pursuant to an advance directive of a now incompetent
patient. Involuntary euthanasia occurs when the life-sustaining treatment is discontinued against
the wishes of the patient. A. MESEL, supra note 29, § 3.9, at 61-64.
121. See DECMING To FoREGo, supra note 7, at 28-30.
122. Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARv. L. R1v. 361 (1985).
123. See E. KEYSERLINGK, supra note 76, at 148-51.
124. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2853 (1990) (citing In re
Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 419, 529 A.2d 434, 477 (1987)).
125. Id.
126. See supra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
127. Two basic kinds of conflicts have been identified: financial and emotional. Often,
family decisionmakers will be heirs of a patient or may be released from financial obligation
if the patient dies. Similarly, a close friend or relative may be "motivated, perhaps uncon-
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the trial court in the Cruzan case. These procedural protections assure
a secure toehold to prevent further decline down the slippery slope.
The slippery slope argument, however, goes further to perceive
the possible tragedy of euthanasia lower down the slope. The ultimate
worry that a surrogate decisionmaker might end another's life too soon
today carries with it the weight of the "Nazi Albatross":'2 the fact
that mass executions of Jews by Germany were preceded by Nazi eu-
thanasia programs designed to end "life unworthy of life."' 29
Some argue that allowing surrogate decisionmaking in the face
of any uncertainty is the "small beginning" of a wedge that inevitably
will lead to the abuse of dependent people. 30 For them, the fear of
the slippery slope seems decisive. Perhaps this is why allowing Mis-
souri to err on the side of life seemed warranted to the Cruzan ma-
jority. It avoided the chance that the voluntary could become
involuntary.'a But legal and medical tradition provide a clear toehold
to assure no slide to such tragic consequences. The line has been tra-
sciously, by a wish to put an end to a tremendous emotional strain on his own life caused by
the patient's illness." A. MEISEL, supra note 29, § 6.25, at 167 (citing In re Visbeck, 210 N.J.
Super. 527, 540, 510 A.2d 125, 132 (1980)).
Conversely, surrogates who decide to maintain life supports "may be motivated by guilt,
by denial of the fact the patient is terminally ill and that death is inevitable, or even by a
desire to inflict suffering on the patient." Id.
Clinical decisionmakers realize that it is often impossible to distinguish between family
members motivated by their own emotional strain and those who know that the patient would
not want that strain to continue. Courts recognize this dynamic by finding that the mere
existence of these conflicts is not sufficient to disqualify a decisionmaker without additional
evidence that the surrogate's judgment is significantly influenced by the conflict. See, e.g.,
McConnell v. Beverly Enterps.-Conn., Inc., 209 Conn. 692, 708, 553 A.2d 596, 604 (1989);
In re Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 274 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Elbaum v. Grace Plaza of
Great Neck, Inc., 148 A.D.2d 244, 254-55, 544 N.Y.S.2d 840, 847 (1989); Leach v. Akron
Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 2, 426 N.E.2d 809, 810 (1980); In re Colyer, 99 Wash.
2d 114, 130 n.4, 660 P.2d 738, 747 n.4 (1983).
128. D. HtmsPrsEY & A. WiC<ETT, supra note 71, at 20-32.
129. R. LIFrON, THE NAZI DOCTORS (1986). The Nazi euthanasia program was never the
subject of positive law because Hitler knew that the public would object. A small group of
doctors, infected with the eugenic belief of Aryan biological superiority, signed on to the Nazi
political agenda that originally used compulsory sterilizations as a means of purifying the body
politic. See Koop & Grant, supra note 105, at 589-91. Eventually, the rationale for sterilization
became the justification for mass murder of those sent to certain state institutions. Attempts
were made to mask the killings by official letters that lied about the cause of death. Hitler
hoped that the reality of war would desensitize the population's concern for human life in
general, and that precious resources such as food could be directed elsewhere. Eventually, gas
chambers perfected at state institutions were reassembled in concentration camps outside
Germany. The euthanasia program within Germany officially ended when individual families
and communities began to question the deaths. R. LFTON, supra, at 89-95.
130. See Koop & Grant, supra note 105, at 589-91.
131. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 426 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (citing Price & Burt,
Sterilization, State Action, and the Concept of Consent, 1975 L. & PSYCHOLOGY Rzv. 58).
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ditionally drawn, as already indicated, between direct killing and re-
fusal of treatment.
132
The line between voluntary and involuntary termination of treat-
ment raises more difficult problems in cases involving permanently
incompetent or unconscious patients. Surrogates necessarily must de-
cide. Leaving the topic of surrogate decisi6nmaking solely to the
'laboratory' of the States," as Justice O'Connor suggested, 33 must
be examined in light of the risk of erroneous decisionmaking, which
was so important to the Rehnquist opinion.
Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed to the need to shift the burden
of persuasion to the family because of the risk of erroneous deci-
sionmaking. But where lies the greatest risk of making the wrong de-
cision? If Nancy Cruzan's family had made an erroneous decision, one
person would suffer-Nancy. 3 4 Yet, if the state of Missouri in fact
erred in insisting that artificial nutrition be continued for Nancy, there
was serious injury not only to Nancy but also to her family.
Furthermore, if the state has the ultimate power to render life and
death decisions for the seriously ill, it has the power to err on behalf
of large groups of people. Following the Supreme Court's logic in
Cruzan, all persons with similar disabilities will be artificially fed re-
gardless of the personal choice of a patient. But this power to decide
has an even darker side. The state that can compel artificial feeding
to preserve life can also stop treatment and thereby destroy entire cat-
egories of the sick and dying. Every slippery slope has a reverse side. 35
Justice Stevens mentions such a possibility: "Tomorrow, another State
equally eager to champion an interest in the 'quality of life' might
favor a policy designed to ensure quick and comfortable deaths by
denying treatment to categories of marginally hopeless cases."'136
Chief Justice Rehnquist rightly perceives the risk of erroneous
decisionmaking. But he ignores another important fact: the state, un-
like families and friends, is totally unable to make personalized de-
cisions. Most families treat the unconscious loved one as a treasured
132. See supra notes 19, 86-91 and accompanying text.
133. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2859 (1990) (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
134. See supra note 118.
135. See Schauer, supra note 122, at 381.
136. Cruzan v. Director, 110 S. Ct. at 2891 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The recent case of Helga Wanglie raises this issue. Doctors in a county hospital there argue
that their desire to stop ventilator support should supersede Mrs. Wanglie's husband's desire
to continue life-sustaining treatment for his comatose wife, based on her strong religious
convictions. The public hospital has petitioned the probate court to appoint a guardian who
will seek to have her life supports removed. As Family Protests, Hospital Seeks an End to
Woman's Life Support, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1991, at Al, col. 1.
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individual because they are aware of that person's history and unique
characteristics. The state, however, is unaware of individual qualities
and inevitably must categorize in order to make medical decisions for
incompetent patients. Entrusting decisionmaking to the state exacer-
bates the risk of error because it does not know and will find it im-
possible to discover the unconscious patient's wishes. Individuals
pigeonholed contrary to their own personal views and values will be
treated according to the state's concept of how those in their group
should be treated; they will be compelled to live and suffer contrary
to their true belief or doomed to die against their will.
The other option, deferring- to family decisionmakers, does not
prevent mistake. But, mistakes that occur will be individual, not in-
stitutionalized, and will be made in good faith by those who care for
that unique person rather than by politicians and bureaucrats who are
strangers and act for reasons of group utility. 13 7 Ultimately, the best
safeguard against abuse is curbing state power by placing decisions
in the hands of persons best able to focus on subjective values and
particular moral facts unique to each patient.
In cases like Cruzan, we should look to families to make crucial
health care decisions precisely to act as a buffer against the oppressive
potential of the state. The Supreme Court majority in Cruzan, there-
fore, did not err in identifying the possibility of mistake in surrogate
decisionmaking. It erred in favoring a remote, depersonalized
stranger-the state-to make the decision. Deference to state power
does not relieve, but only aggravates the virus of mistake. Hitler rightly
feared the early end of his euthanasia program if left to the people.
Though Missouri's motives appear beneficent, deferring to the state
increases the vulnerability of dependent people. The slope is far more
slippery when the state preempts life and death decisions.
State court decisions prior to the United States Supreme Court's
Cruzan decision and the underlying philosophical positions on which
they were based, established the moral right of Nancy Cruzan to have
her family, not the state, decide whether and when to terminate ar-
tificial feeding. One question remains, however: does the United States
137. The President's Commission found two courses of care unacceptable for PVS patients:
those that "fail to respect a patient's living body, or would constitute an irresponsible
stewardship of a community's resources." DEcmINo TO FOREGO, supra note 7, at 188.
The first would occur if PVS patients were treated in ways that violate common expectations
about humane care, such as abusive treatment or direct killing. See, e.g., Smith, Legal
Recognition of NeoCortical Death, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 850 (1986). The latter occurs if care
for a PVS patient "precludes the treatment of others who would be helped far more" or
"when resources expended on PVS patients thwart other important social goals." DEcmnIN
TO FOREGO, supra note 7, at 188-89. The Missouri Supreme Court in Cruzan simply ignored
the enormous cost of keeping Nancy and dozens or ultimately hundreds like her alive with
total medical care for many years.
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Constitution impose some minimum standard that would prohibit the
state from interfering with the value judgments involved in her fa-
mily's decision to allow Nancy to die?
I. Constitutional Analysis
Philosophical positions deeply held by individual justices no doubt
influence many of the Supreme Court's majority, concurring, or dis-
senting decisions.1 8 Nonetheless, the Court's decisions seldom rely ex-
plicitly on these underlying positions. The Court can never forget Justice
Holmes's stinging barb in Lochner, "The Fourteenth Amendment does
not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics, ... General propo-
sitions do not decide concrete cases. "139
A. Conservative Model
The Court's own method of analysis, not explicitly philosophical,
provides surer footing for applying the Constitution in a novel case
such as that involving Nancy Cruzan. Of course, the Constitution
speaks not a word about such a case, and no one approach to con-
stitutional analysis of individual implied rights has captured unani-
mous assent on the Court. Nonetheless, the thoughtful, fully articulated
methodology followed by two recent, highly respected conservative
Justices will best undergird the arguments for constitutional protection
of the right of future Cruzan families to terminate their daughter's
treatment.
"Conservative" obviously is a term of many hues and shades, not
uniformly applicable to any Justice in each and every decision. 14 Cen-
tral to any conservative analysis of a new constitutional issue is a re-
spect for the past.' 4' The second Justice Harlan and Justice Powell fit
most everyone's definition of conservative. Their approach, therefore,
to fundamental rights or liberty interests not explicitly based on the
text of the Constitution will provide a framework for this analysis of
the Cruzan case.
Both Harlan, in Poe v. Ullman,"42 and Powell, in Moore v. East
Cleveland, 43 appreciated the hazards, exposed in Lochner, of finding
138. Elfenbein, The Myth of Conservatism as a Constitutional Philosophy, 71 IowA L.
REV. 401 (1986) (discussing the role of political philosophies in judicial decisionmaking).
139. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J. dissenting).
140. West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 Mic. L. Ray. 641, 641-42
(1990).
141. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1031-47 (1990).
142. 367 U.S. 497, 522-55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
143. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
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substantive protection for rights implied in the bafflingly vague words
of the fourteenth amendment: "[N]o State [shall] deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 1" On the
one hand, if the due process clause merely guaranteed fair procedures,
Harlan insisted, then a state law, though guaranteeing "the fairest
possible procedure," could "nevertheless destroy the enjoyment of all
three" (i.e., life, liberty, and property). 45 But once a Justice accepts
the due process clause as a substantive limit on state laws, Holmes's
gibe returns. "As the history of the Lochner era demonstrates," Pow-
ell confessed, "there is reason for concern lest the only limits to such
judicial intervention become the predilections of those who happen at
the time to be Members of the Court."' 46
Harlan and Powell struggled to avoid the appearance of incor-
porating into the due process clause their own philosophical predi-
lections by searching in history, tradition, and precedent for a more
objective meaning of "liberty" and "due process." Harlan, in a pas-
sage quoted with approval by Powell, 47 acknowledged that the amor-
phous concept of "due process" could never be codified.1 48 "Due
Process," he insisted, "through the course of this Court's decisions
* . . has represented the balance which our Nation, built upon pos-
tulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between
liberty and the demands of organized society."' 149 To furnish content
for open-ended terms like "due process" and "liberty," Harlan and
Powell looked to "what history teaches are the traditions from which
[this country] developed as well as the traditions from which it
broke."' 50 The liberty protected from state interference by the four-
teenth amendment due process clause, Harlan and Powell agreed, means
far more than the discrete and "isolated points pricked out in terms
of" the federal guarantees in the Bill of Rights. 5' Each clause of the
144. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
145. Poe, 367 U.S. at 541.
146. Moore, 431 U.S. at 502.
147. Id. at 501.
148. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 543. The Harlan and Powell insight into the broad, undefined scope of "liberty"
in the fourteenth amendment is confirmed by recent historical scholarship. See W. NELSON,
THE FOURTEENTH AmENDMENT 140-47 (1988).
For Justice Harlan, the fourteenth amendment, not the Bill of Rights, restricted state power
to impair the procedural or substantive rights of individuals. As he insisted in his dissent in
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), "the First section of the Fourteenth Amendment
was meant neither to incorporate, nor to be limited to, the specific guarantees of the first
eight Amendments." Id. at 174 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
But for Harlan, the meaning of the crucial restricting words of the fourteenth amendment,
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Bill of Rights, of course, helps fill out the meaning of "liberty." But
the concept of "liberty" reaches further, Harlan and Powell argued:
It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a free-
dom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless res-
traints... and which also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive
judgment must, that certain interests require particularly careful scru-




Harlan underscored his point by insisting that the Court must
look beyond the narrow words of the various clauses of the Bill of
Rights. Fourteenth amendment "liberty" embraces the purposes be-
hind each clause of the first eight amendments. Harlan's own words
best convey his conviction:
For it is the purposes of those guarantees and not their text, the rea-
sons for their statement by the Framers and not the statement itself
... which have led to their present status in the compendious notion
of "liberty" embraced in the Fourteenth Amendment.'
Harlan wrote his dissenting opinion in Poe154 to identify a con-
stitutionally-based restriction on the State of Connecticut's power to
"liberty" and "due process," only could be grasped in light of our nation's history and
tradition. This history included the enormously significant fact that a Bill of Rights had been
added to the Constitution. "[Ihe Bill of Rights," he stated, "is evidence ... of the content
Americans find in the term 'liberty' and of American standards of fundamental fairness." Id.
at 179.
152. Poe, 367 U.S. at 543.
153. Id. at 544. Harlan's insistence that the clauses of the Bill of Rights must not be
narrowly limited to their text has been fully confirmed by the historical analysis of the ninth
amendment: "the enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CoNsT. amend. IX. Some interpret the
ninth amendment to mean that there are rights, unenumerated elsewhere in the Constitution,
which are retained by the people and which serve as judicially enforceable constraints on
government. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CoRt. L. REv. 1 (1988);
Massey, Federalism and Fundamental Rights: The Ninth Amendment, 38 HAsTNrGs L.J. 305
(1987); Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. Cm. L. Rev. 1127, 1161-67
(1987); Symposium on Interpreting the Ninth Amendment, 64 CHm.-Ke N L. REv. 37 (1988).
Others, however, read the ninth amendment as intended primarily to bar an expansive
interpretation of the Federal government's enumerated power. This residual rights approach
emphasizes that the ninth amendment reserves rights to the people precisely by assuring that
the government's powers are narrowly construed. McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth
Amendment, 90 CoLumM. L. REv. 1215 (1990).
For Harlan, who looks to the Bill of Rights as a way of finding historical tools to unlock
the meaning of "liberty" in the fourteenth amendment, either reading of the ninth amendment
suffices to confirm his point. The ninth amendment, after all, is also part of our history and
tradition and provides essential insights into the purposes behind the text of the first eight
amendments. The ninth amendment is best viewed as a rule of constitutional interpretation.
It instructs the Court today that it may not construe anything in the Constitution, including
"liberty" in the fourteenth amendment, to disparage rights retained by the people. L. TRmE
& M. DoRe, ON RE DING =s CoNsTIrtmoN 54 (1991). Whatever else the Court might say to
explain why Nancy Cruzan did not retain the right to have her parents decide to terminate
her treatment, it may not rely solely on the argument that her right does not exist because it
is not enumerated in the Constitution.
154. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522-55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (dismissing as
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criminalize the use of contraceptives. He thought the Court should
have declared unconstitutional the Connecticut statute, which "al-
low[ed] the State to enquire into, prove and punish married people
for the private use of their marital intimacy."'' 5 It exceeded the state's
constitutional power because it "involve[d] what, by common un-
derstanding throughout the English-speaking world, must be granted
to be a most fundamental aspect of 'liberty,' the privacy of the home
in its most basic sense, and it is this which requires that the statute
be subjected to 'strict scrutiny."1
5 6
Justice Powell's plurality opinion in Moore15 7 employed the same
methodology to identify a constitutional right of family members to
live together in the face of a city ordinance that restricted that right
to a few narrow categories. Looking to precedent as well as to history
and tradition, Powell concluded, "Our decisions establish that the
Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the
institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition." 1
58
One final element characterizes a conservative model for pro-
tecting implied fundamental rights: the principle of federalism. It is
likely that this principle was crucial in Cruzan. In her concurring opin-
ion, Justice O'Connor ultimately turned to federalism to decide that
Missouri's refusal to allow Nancy's parents to terminate artificial feed-
ing did not violate the Constitution. 5 9 She relied on the oft-quoted
passage from Justice Brandeis, who insisted that an advantage of the
federal system was that individual states can "serve as labora-
tor[ies]."' ° Justices Harlan and Powell both repeatedly looked to this
same principle of federalism and cited the same words of Justice Bran-
deis.' 6' As Harlan put it, "one of the great strengths of our federal
system is that we have, in the forty-eight states, forty-eight experi-
mental social laboratories."' 162
nonjusticiable the challenge to Connecticut's criminal penalties for the use of contraceptive
drugs or devices). Harlan's dissent in Poe became a concurring opinion when the Court in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), finally held the Connecticut birth control law
unconstitutional.
155. Poe, 367 U.S. at 548.
156. Id.
157. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
158. Id. at 503.
159. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2859 (1990) (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
160. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
161. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 568 n.13 (1985)
(Powell, J., dissenting); San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973) (Powell,
J., writing for the court); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 376 (1972) (Powell, J.,
concurring); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 193 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
162. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 505 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
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But Harlan and Powell recognized the limits to federalism. When
a state had intruded upon a fundamental personal liberty interest, Har-
lan and Powell upheld the liberty interest, even though only implicit
in the fourteenth amendment, and held the state law unconstitutional.
Poe and Moore are striking illustrations that the principle of feder-
alism can be trumped by an implied liberty interest.
Despite the principle of federalism, conservative justices can find
an implied constitutional basis for declaring invalid "all substantial
arbitrary [state] impositions and purposeless restraints.' 6 3 Missouri's
intrusion into the Cruzan family's decision to terminate Nancy's ar-
tificial feeding fits this description.
B. Application to Cruzan
Nancy Cruzan's case cries out for a sensitive approach similar to
Harlan's opinion in Poe and Powell's opinion in Moore. The rights
that Justices Harlan and Powell have discerned in the fourteenth
amendment are closely related to the rights asserted on behalf of Nancy.
Furthermore, the methodology followed by Justices Harlan and Pow-
ell sets forth the most fruitful and the most solidly established con-
servative approach to finding an implied right for Nancy Cruzan to
have her family make the decision whether to order termination of
artificial nutrition.
In Cruzan v. Harmon,'64 the Missouri Supreme Court imposed
state norms and state values-the state's purported overriding interest
in life-upon the family's attempt to terminate artificial nutrition to
Nancy in her persistent vegetative state. The decision to end treatment
was taken out of the loving hands of Nancy's family. The issue before
the United States Supreme Court should have been: Did Nancy Cruzan
have a constitutional right to have the decisions concerning termi-
nation of her medical treatment made by her caring parents? Does the
Constitution protect patients like Nancy from the unwarranted intru-
sion of the state into this area of private family decisionmaking?
The State of Missouri had a role to play in this decisionmaking
process, but its role was purely procedural. The state should provide
procedures, within hospital ethics committees in the first instance and
in courts if necessary, to assure that the Cruzan family's decision' 6
was based on reliable medical information and not motivated by self-
interest. 66 But the state should be constitutionally barred from im-
163. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
164. 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
165. In Nancy's case her parents, by their continuing attendance, had demonstrated that
they should make health-care decisions for her, rather than her husband who had sought and
obtained a divorce after the accident.
166. State procedural protection is discussed supra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
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posing substantive standards on this life and death decision. The norms
and values in this decision should have come from those closest to
Nancy, those who knew and loved her and could best and most sen-
sitively do what Nancy would have wanted done. 67
Although Nancy had lost all conscious life, she had not lost her
constitutional rights. She was a person who could not be deprived of
her liberty without due process. 68 Because of her permanent vegetative
state, however, her right necessarily took on a new meaning, a right
to have health care decisions made in her interest by those who best
knew her and appreciated her moral sensitivity and value system. As
one commentator has written:
[Flamily members are best qualified to make these decisions, because
of their knowledge of the patient's likely preferences and their special
bonds with the patient. Not only are family members most likely to
be privy to any relevant statements that patients have made on the
topics of treatment or its termination, but they also have longstand-
ing knowledge of the patient's character traits. Although evidence
of character traits may seem inconclusive to third parties, closely
related persons may, quite legitimately, "just know" what the patient
would want in a way that transcends purely logical evidence. Long-
standing knowledge, love, and intimacy make family members the
best candidates for implementing the patient's probable wishes and
upholding her values.' 69
Although no longer competent to make her own health care de-
cisions, it was Nancy's right to have her caring family make these
decisions in her best interest. 70 Prior to its decision in Cruzan, the
Supreme Court had never addressed this right of an inconipetent per-
son to have life and death decisions concerning her medical treatment
made by her family. Following the guidance of Justices Harlan and
Powell, we can find faint traces of this right in analogous Supreme
Court precedents dealing with implied fourteenth amendment rights,
as well as in history and tradition.
Justice Harlan in Poe insisted on strict judicial scrutiny of a Con-
necticut law that had violated "the privacy of the home in its most
167. As discussed earlier, Nancy Cruzan's family should not have been compelled merely
to implement a decision that Nancy previously had made to terminate treatment. Such decisions
or statements, made in good health, are inherently unreliable and difficult to prove. See supra
notes 109-114 and accompanying text.
168. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1982).
169. Rhoden, supra note 106, at 438.
170. Garvey, Freedom and Choice in Constitutional Law, 94 HAv. L. REv. 1756, 1782
(1981). As Justice Stevens stated in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 825 n.23 (1988):
"Children, the insane, and those who are irreversibly ill with loss of brain function, for
instance, all retain 'rights,' to be sure, but often such rights are only meaningful as they are
exercised by agents acting with the best interests of their principals in mind."
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basic sense.' '171 As marital privacy is a matter of family privacy pro-
tected from state intrusion, so also are the family decisions respecting
the medical care and death of a loved one, decisions that traditionally
have been made by the family within the home. As Harlan observed,
"if the physical curtilage of the home is protected, it is surely as a
result of solicitude to protect the privacies of the life within.... The
home derives its pre-eminence as the seat of family life."' 72 Heightened
scrutiny was essential in Poe, Harlan insisted, precisely because "the
State [was] asserting the right to enforce its moral judgment" con-
cerning marital intimacy. 73 In Cruzan, the state of Missouri likewise
has forced its moral judgment-that the value of life must transcend
all other moral values-upon the closest family circle.
Justice Powell in Moore also insisted that "the Constitution pro-
tects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the
family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."' 7 4 He
spoke in Moore of the right of family members to share the same home
where Mrs. Moore's two grandsons, who were not brothers, lived with
her. But his words apply as well to the right of Nancy Cruzan to have
family members decide whether to terminate medical treatment on her
behalf. The right Justice Powell found as a bar to state intrusion into
the family would apply to Mrs. Moore's grandsons whether they were
minors or adults. Similarly the right asserted by Nancy Cruzan's fam-
ily should have been applicable whether Nancy was a child or a per-
manently unconscious adult. Moreover, the right asserted in Cruzan
applies broadly to family health care decisions for incompetent re-
latives, whether the relative is a child, a parent, or a spouse. Certainly
in some cases the closest caring relative might be a grandparent' or an
aunt or uncle or cousin. As Justice Powell insisted in Moore, "in times
of adversity ... the broader family has tended to come together for
mutual sustenance,"' 7 5 such as caring for a dying loved one.
Other decisions by the Supreme Court have upheld the rights of
family members to make uniquely important decisions affecting their
life or destiny. State laws unjustifiably trampling on these rights have
been held unconstitutional, even though the Constitution itself fails
explicitly to mention the rights.176 "There does exist a 'private realm
171. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 551.
173. Id. at 548.
174. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
175. Id. at 505.
176. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (compulsory school attendance law held
inapplicable to Amish children on free exercise grounds); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
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of family life which the state cannot enter' . . . that has been afforded




In her Cruzan opinion, Justice O'Connor highlighted this point:
"[Als patients are likely to select a family member as a surrogate...
giving effect to a proxy's decisions may also protect the 'freedom of
personal choice in matters of ... family life.""'17  Chief Justice Rehn-
quist attempted in Cruzan to weaken the authority of such cases by
contending that they uphold the constitutionality of a state's "favored
treatment of traditional family relationships," but cannot be used to
argue that a state "must recognize the privacy of those relation-
ships."'' 79 Rehnquist simply ignored cases like Meyer,' 0 Pierce,'8 ' Gris-
wold,'82 Loving, '3 and Yoder.'8 4 In these cases the Constitution clearly
was applied as a limitation on the state's power to intrude into areas
of family decisionmaking, even though there is no explicit constitu-
tional guarantee of the family right at issue in any of them.
As already discussed, if Nancy had been competent, state courts
would have allowed her to refuse treatment or to terminate treatment
that had been begun.' 85 The Supreme Court also has recognized that
a person has a fundamental liberty interest in resisting state ordered
invasions of her bodily integrity. "lilt is obvious," the Court has re-
cently reiterated, "that [a] physical intrusion, penetrating beneath the
skin, infringes an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable. "186
(statutory scheme to prevent interracial marriages held violative of fourteenth amendment);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (statute prohibiting use of contraceptives held
to violate the right to marital privacy); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (sterilization
of "habitual criminals" violates fourteenth amendment); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925) (mandating public school education for children held to violate fourteenth amend-
ment); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (state law forbidding the teaching of foreign
languages to children until they passed the eighth grade held violative of fourteenth amendment).
177. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 842 (1977) (quoting Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
178. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2858 (1990) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639 (1974)).
179. Id. at 2855.
180. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (upholding right of families, not the state,
to decide whether to educate their children in a foreign language).
181. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (upholding right of parents to direct
the education of their children).
182. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (upholding right of married couples to
use birth control).
183. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (upholding right of individuals to interracial
marriage).
184. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (upholding right of parents to refuse to
allow their children to attend high school).
185. See supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
186. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989).
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Similarly the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld "[t]he fun-
damental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and
management of their child.' 81 s7 Even the extremely sensitive decision
of parents voluntarily committing their minor child to a psychiatric
hospital has been upheld by the Court.' 8 No rational distinction can
be made between these cases and the right of Nancy Cruzan, as an
incompetent adult, to have her parents decide on her behalf to ter-
minate artificial feeding.
This right of Nancy Cruzan rests not only on these analogous
precedents of the Supreme Court, but also on a long-standing tradition
of the role of family in American society. Again, following in the steps
of Justices Harlan and Powell, we can find clear roots of this right
in our history and tradition.
Until the Second World War, people generally died at home. His-
torically in this country, the family "was the usual place of recourse
for sick persons and the elderly."' 89 The society of the founding fa-
thers thought that the home and the family needed protection from
governmental intrusion in the form of the quartering of troops or war-
rantless searches of the home; the drafters of the third and fourth
amendments reacted to governmental abuses with which they were fa-
miliar. If they had ever dreamed that state officials would overrule
health care decisions of the family for a dying relative, they surely
likewise would have prohibited such officious intermeddling. Since
virtually everyone died at home,90 secure from officially dictated treat-
ment, no explicit protection of the right found its way into the Bill
of Rights. The drafters of our Bill of Rights could do no more than
to assure the people through the ninth amendment that they retained
other unenumerated rights as limits on governmental interference.' 9'
At the time the fourteenth amendment was written, American
criminal law distinguished between withdrawal of medical treatment
and assisting suicide. 92 No cases can be found at that time in which
a family member was prosecuted for deciding, on behalf of an in-
competent relative, to discontinue some medical treatment thought
necessary to life. At the time of the drafting of the fourteenth amend-
187. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
188. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
189. Demos, The American Family in Past Time, 43 Am. ScHoLAR 422, 425 (1974); see
also Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505 n.16 (1977) (plurality opinion) (protecting
the rights of a non-nuclear family brought together by tragedy).
190. See Thomas, Dying as Failure, 447 ANNALs 1, 2-4 (1980); Mauksch, The Organizational
Context of Dying, in E. Kfm1LER-Ross, DEATH, supra note 78, at 7-24.
191. For commentary on the ninth amendment, see supra note 153.
192. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
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ment's limitation on state deprivations of personal liberty, Americans
had a clear and vivid image of death and dying. The widely read novels
of the period portrayed dying as entirely a family affair. 93 The loved
one died at home surrounded by family and perhaps by close friends
and a clergyman. State officials played no role whatever in this in-
timate setting.
Conservative Justices like Harlan and Powell, however, look be-
yond history and precedent to the principle of federalism. Indeed, the
Cruzan plurality and concurring opinions manifest the crucial im-
portance of deference to state decisionmakers. But as illustrated in
cases like Poe and Moore,1 94 no deference to state decisions is due
when, without a substantial interest, the state has seriously interfered
with a fundamental right. After all, according to federalism's basic
tenet, decisions should be made by the unit closest to those who will
be affected by them, by the unit most sensitive to individual rights
and least likely to err, by the states rather than by the federal gov-
ernment. Those who look to the principle of federalism to provide
guidance in this type of case proclaim that state governments should
check the irresponsible or oppressive potential of the national gov-
ernment.
95
Viewing federalism in light of its historical meaning, this principle
should have heightened the claim of the Cruzan family to decide
whether and when to terminate Nancy's treatment. The family was
the decisionmaking unit closest to Nancy, most sensitive to her rights,
and most strongly motivated to resist oppressive governmental intru-
sion. As we have already seen, 196 the risk of erroneous life and death
decisionmaking by the state far exceeded the risk of erroneous de-
cisionmaking by Nancy's family. If, as Justice O'Connor insisted, the
state's role as experimental laboratory should be preserved to safe-
guard the liberty interests of permanently incompetent patients like
Nancy Cruzan, 97 should not the family have had an even stronger
claim to agonize over what was best for Nancy? Perhaps Justice
193. This American portrait of death has been well captured in four widely read novels of
the mid-nineteenth century: L. ALcoTT, LITTLE WOMEN chs. 17-19 (1868); M. CUlmsiNs, TiE
LAMPLIGHTER chs. 15, 25 (1854); H. STOWE, UNCLE TOM'S CABIN chs. 24-26 (1852); E.
WETHERELL, THE WIDE, WIDE WORLD chs. 41-42 (1850). That these four novels were best
sellers is documented in F. MoTr, GOLDEN MULTITUDES: THE STORY OF BEST SELLERS IN THE
UNITED STATES 307-09 (1947).
194. See supra notes 154-175 and accompanying text
195. See Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third
Century, 88 CoLuM. L. Rav. 1, 4-10 (1988); Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 GA. L. REV.
917, 918 (1985).
196. See supra notes 134-137 and accompanying text.
197. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2859 (1990) (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
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COMING TO TERMS WITH DEATH
O'Connor did not reflect on how frightening it is to allow the state
to experiment with life and death decisions.
Certain values lie close to the heart of our constitutional system
of limited government. The Supreme Court has surrounded these val-
ues with the ramparts of strict judicial scrutiny. Conviction of an in-
nocent person is so abhorrent to our system of government that the
Court has insisted a person be presumed innocent. The government
must bear the heavy weight of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. 198 Likewise, when the Supreme Court at last appreciated the
horror of apartheid society, it required strictest judicial scrutiny of
racially discriminatory classifications.'9 The Court also has protected
the entire democratic process from governmental subversion by im-
posing the highest burden of justification when public officials attempt
to suppress a particular message. 2°°
The right asserted here merits no less protection by the Court.
The Court long ago proclaimed, "The child is not the mere creature
of the State." 201 In our constitutional system this aphorism implicitly
has been expanded to announce that no person is the mere creature
of the state. The outrage that the Court has expressed in response to
the Connecticut birth control law,2 or the East Cleveland restriction
on which family members may live together23 is that these state laws
take over the lives of those they touch.2 4 The state must not occupy
the lives of the people; it must not attempt to coerce uniformity. For
this reason, the Court has required strict judicial scrutiny when state
laws intrude into this realm of personal privacy. The state of Missouri
should not be allowed to standardize one of the most basic and in-
timate of personal areas-the right of an incompetent to have her fam-
ily, not the state, decide whether and when to terminate medical
treatment."' 5
Coda
No one would expect government officials to interfere with the
chess match between Antonius Block and death. Block himself decides
when to end the game.
198. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
199. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492-96 (1954).
200. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101-02 (1972); Stone, Content Regulation and
the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189, 196-97 (1983).
201. Pierce v. Soe'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
202. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
203. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
204. Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REv. 737, 783-87 (1989).
205. Missouri's withdrawal from the case following the Supreme Court's decision, see
supra note 8, acknowledges its own victory as pyrrhic and the Cruzan family's as genuine.
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In the Cruzan case, Nancy Cruzan came to terms with death as
much as she ever could. Her earlier statements and her basic life values
had communicated to those who knew and loved her best that she
would want to end the game. Nancy's family came to terms with her
death. They accepted the medical facts and they best understood Nan-
cy's moral world. By what right, by what constitutional power, did
the state of Missouri refuse to allow Nancy to die?
